Open-source intelligence (OSINT)
🔻 IMPORTANT 【重要】為6%人口（炒家階層）撤辣過後被棄之不顧的深層次矛盾
▪️就政治，不僅是西方，一個普世概念是，一個國家的要素（一個國家成立的場域）是人民的信賴，也就是中國領導人所稱民心。換言之，一個社會或一個國家首先建立在信賴。這就是為什麼敵對勢力專門打擊當地居民對政府的信賴。即最有效打擊和瓦解一個國家的方式絕對主攻人民對政府的信賴。不過，如撤辣所示，西方或任何反華敵對勢力根本不需特別在本港做出任何黑色作戰（black ops）或制裁，為什麼？是因為港府糟透的失策和無策就會自動化地惡化居民的民生和民怨。在本港統治階級中，專門服務不到50萬的貪婪炒家階層根本無法換來剩下被炒家玩死和兇狠剝削的絕大多數人口（因超高樓價而困苦在追求首置或供樓的中產階層和租屋的基層階層在內的勞動人口）的信賴。光是簡單人口數據而言，約45萬炒家或700萬非炒家或非業主們，哪一個群組則是政策要顧慮到的？顯然則是後者，是因爲後者則需要政府的協助解困。甚至，炒家階層的特色之一是，它往往是移民導向，甚至是多重國籍和海外物業擁有者，也就系統地轉移本地利潤到海外。這就是為何反投機的稅收是絕不能撤的。鼓勵這個投機活動的是金融黨（摩根，匯豐代表的金融寡頭），地產黨（長實，新世界，新鴻基，恆基地產代表的地產寡頭），以及本身是炒家的官僚和政客們，以及大約45萬的炒家階層（它們誇張和超乎尋常的特色是一人壟斷和獨攬的公職，國籍，公司和物業數量之多，即不但一人佔據超過幾十個多重公職/非公職的公職，也同時擁有三個五個或更多國籍，也擁有超過百間公司和物業；炒家乃主宰本港政治的本港統治階級的主要成分）。重點是，它們都是在國家危急中，第一個有能力帶著錢財逃亡至海外的。那麼，撤辣理所當然的是本港統治階級的要求，也是與不反對23條立法的政治交易籌碼。是的，港府把23條立法和撤辣進行政治交易了，這就是為什麼從鄉議局到地產寡頭都在一邊要求撤辣之際，一邊並列表態支持23條立法的原因。也就是，港府自己也明知在本港有能力和財富可以發動政治活動和威脅官方的勢力莫過於大約45萬炒家階層。譬如，中原地產的施永青在2024年2月20日公開威脅陳茂波，所謂不撤辣的政治後果是有道理的，極具代表性的（URL）。不過，在大約一個禮拜前（2024年2月21日和22日），早就知道撤辣一事的則是投資行摩根大通（JP Morgan）和匯豐（HSBC Global Research）。他們以預測的方式早就透露了內情。之後，則奇怪地停止了喊撤辣的港媒大合唱，約一個禮拜的集體沈默正是炒家階層核心部分已知撤辣的財政預算案內容的證據。此外，同上次減辣時，在大約一個禮拜前（2023年10月19日），財政司透過星島日報放風不同（施政報告 | 消息：政府不會全面為樓市辣招撤辣）。撤辣過後被棄之不顧的深層次矛盾...
As far as politics is concerned, and not only in the West, it is a universal concept that the essential element of a state (the field on which a state is founded) is the trust of the people, or what Chinese leaders call the heart of the people. In other words, a society or a state is first and foremost built on trust. This is why hostile forces specialize in attacking the trust of the local population in the government. In other words, the most effective way to attack and dismantle a country is to attack the people's trust in the government. However, as the recent withdrawal of the anti-speculation tax has shown, there is no need for the West or any anti-Chinese hostile force to engage in any black ops or sanctions in Hong Kong specifically. Why? Because the Hong Kong government's abysmal blunders and inaction automatically worsens the people's livelihood and grievances. In the ruling class of Hong Kong, the greedy speculators, who the HKSARG serves less than 500,000 people exclusively, are simply unable to gain the trust of the vast majority of the remaining population (the middle class and the grassroots who rent flats and the working population who are trapped in the pursuit of first homeownership or mortgage repayment due to the ultra-high property prices) who are being played to death by the speculators and are being exploited ferociously by the speculators who HKSARG serves. In terms of simple demographic data, which group should be taken into account by the policy: the 450,000 speculators or the 7 million non-speculators or non-homeowners? Obviously, it is the latter group, because the latter group needs the government's assistance to solve their problems. Even one of the characteristics of the speculator class is that it is often immigrant-oriented, or even multinational and overseas property owners, which systematically transfers local profits overseas. This is why anti-speculation taxes must never be withdrawn. This speculative activity is encouraged by the Financial Party (the financial oligarchs represented by J.P. Morgan and HSBC), the Real Estate Party (the real estate oligarchy represented by Cheung Kong, New World, Sun Hung Kai, Henderson Land), as well as bureaucrats and politicians who are speculators themselves, and a speculative class of about 450,000 people (whose exaggerated and extraordinary feature is the one-man monopoly and monopoly on the number of public offices, nationalities, corporations, and properties, i.e., not only does one man hold more than dozens of multi-public/'non-public' public offices, but he also holds three, five or more nationalities, and more than a hundred or more properties, and is also the owner of more than one hundred companies). The point is that they are the first to be able to take their money and flee overseas in times of national crisis. It is only natural, then, that the removal of the anti-speculation tax is a demand of the ruling class in Hong Kong, and a bargaining chip in the political bargaining with those who are able to oppose the legislation of Article 23. Yes, the Hong Kong government has made a political deal between the legislation of Article 23 and the withdrawal of the anti-speculation tax. This is why the Heung Yee Kuk and the oligarchs of the real estate sector all demanded the withdrawal of the anti-speculation tax on the one hand, and stated that they support the legislation of Article 23 on the other. That is to say, the Hong Kong government itself knows that there is no force in Hong Kong with the power and wealth to initiate political activities and threaten the government rather than the 450,000 or so speculators. For example, Shih Wing-ching of Centaline Property openly threatened Paul Chan on February 20, 2024, that the so-called political consequences of not removing the anti-speculation tax were justified here in this context. This is extremely representative. However, about a week ago (February 21 and 22, 2024), those who knew about the withdrawal of the anti-speculation tax were the investment bank J.P. Morgan and HSBC Global Research. They revealed the inside story in a predictive manner. Then, strangely, the chorus of Hong Kong media outlets calling for the withdrawal of the anti-speculation tax has stopped, and the collective silence for about a week is evidence that the core of the speculator class knows about the contents of the Budget speech on the withdrawal of the anti-speculation tax. Moreover, unlike the last time when the anti-speculation tax was cut, about a week ago (October 19, 2023), the Financial Secretary leaked the news through Sing Tao Daily.
▪️就香港社會而言，約750萬3千1百個總人口（2023年底；港府統計處的人口估計）中，擁有兩個以上物業的本港地產炒家階層大約45萬5千1百24個（據運房局初步書面答覆立法會財務委員會的2020年3月31日的紀錄）。這約6%是本港超高地價，超高樓價，超高租金，超高物價的元兇和集體推手。並且，據住宅物業買賣合約加蓋印花申請顯示，當非本地炒家的申請次數從2018年的611個，2019年的398個，2020年的116個逐漸減少之際，本地炒家的申請次數則從2018年的60,909個，2019年的63,145個，2020年64,446個逐漸一路增加了（URL）。光是這些數據也證實了辣招（2010年以來實施的反投機稅；對需首置/自住的本地永久居民毫無關係，辣招曾來都不存在），貿易戰（特朗普），反修例（示威者），疫情（新冠病毒）都與抑制樓價無直接的關聯，也不能歸結於這些主體。換言之，貪婪投機份子/所謂投資者/自私炒家正是對總體的民生帶來毀滅性打擊的超高樓價的主因。如美國聯儲局的利率水準的起伏（URL）與本港樓價的起伏形成反比率，美國/美元銀行利率愈高，本港樓價則愈受壓。當美國聯儲局調低利率的2020年和2021年（2022年初為止）之間（聯儲局的利率在2018年1月的1.41大幅降到2020年4月的0.05%掀起了本港史上最大的地產炒風，這完全合乎上述數據的變遷；此外，國安法的出台也根本不是抑制樓價的因素），本港樓價不顧那些諸事件和政策因素都飆升和記錄了史上高峰。因此，撤不撤辣都會跟著美國聯儲局的利率高低起伏。撤辣的問題是炒家階層擁有和處理越高樓價單位，則越獲利。同時，以同等比率減少港府的印花稅稅收。誠然，撤辣的最大獲利者是最頂層的地產炒家們，譬如，擁有101個物業以上的36個頂級炒家們。撤辣是專門向炒家富豪貴族的利益輸送，也是本身是炒家的陳茂波以及官僚們的自相利益衝突。不過，只擁有一個物業單位的大約1,653,963個業主們（多數為自住）則都是潛在的獲利者。其餘絕大部分本港人口非業主們都毫無利益。撤辣一事彰顯了，所謂‘解決深層次矛盾’，‘徹底解決房屋問題’等官方口號徹底淪為虛假的，是因為在高企的樓價連10%都尚未降低之前，撤除反投機稅來吹起另一長期炒風與‘解決深層次矛盾’的政策方向全然背道而馳。在2024年2月28日，本身是個炒家家庭（撤辣獲利者）的財政司陳茂波（偉活發展有限公司）應地產霸權炒家群組的自私要求宣佈了撤辣。史上樓價紀錄最高峰的2020年和2021年間早就有撤辣的鼓聲和邪風，為的是讓本來超高的樓價進一步炒上天價，不過，這個陽謀徹底失敗了（隨著俄烏戰爭的爆發，而聯儲局從長期利率0.08，2022年3月起逐漸調高，本港樓價，如私人樓售價指數和按月變幅就隨著前者的調節逐漸受壓了）。除了撤辣證實了港府還是個地產商的政府，徹底背棄了‘解決深層次矛盾’的政策方針之外，港府失去了，也寧願放棄了佔總人口多數的民心。總之，五眼聯盟根本不需要特別花費針對港府做出黑色作戰或經濟制裁，是因為港府專門服務貪婪炒家階層的後果，失策和無策影響，其他絕大多數的民心就自動背離和造成民生每下愈況。撤辣就是不歸路，徹底放棄了解決深層次矛盾。於此正相反的方向是，降低超高樓價到基層可負擔的水平來綜合降低超高租金和超高物價來釋放本地生產力，經商活力和購買力。這個就是所謂經濟模式轉型的內涵。目前，招商引資和輸入廉價工人都是維持既得利益勢力的舊模式，十分被動，甚至，前者往往最終淪為不動產項目；後者則是為了減輕改善本地勞工福利的社會壓力。其中，任何一項都不是有利於本地勞動者階級的。何況，不做任何實際經濟模式改革的盛事/公關（所謂盛事經濟；政府替寡頭集團花公帑舉辦大型商業/公關活動；而公關和盛事本來都是由商界，個別企業該自費舉辦的）以及一昧大量輸入已改變消費模式的內地客則也都是內容空洞的大花筒。
As far as Hong Kong society is concerned, out of a total population of about 7.531 million (end of 2023; population estimate by the Census and Statistics Department), there are about 455,124 local property speculators owning more than two properties (according to the records of March 31, 2020, as per the preliminary written reply of the Transport and Housing Bureau to the Finance Committee of the Legislative Council). These 6% of the demography, speculators are the culprits and the collective driving force behind the ultra-high land prices, ultra-high property prices, ultra-high rents and ultra-high prices in Hong Kong. Moreover, according to the stamping applications for sale and purchase agreements of residential properties, while the number of applications by non-local speculators has been gradually decreasing from 611 in 2018, 398 in 2019 and 116 in 2020, and the number of applications by local speculators has been gradually increasing all the way from 60,909 in 2018, 63,145 in 2019 and 64,446 in 2020. These figures alone also confirm that the Spicy Countermeasures (anti-speculation tax implemented 2010 to February 28, 2024, had no relevance to local permanent residents who need to buy their first home/owner-occupation; Spicy Countermeasures never existed for them), Trade War (Trump), Anti-Amendment (protesters), and the Epidemic (New Coronavirus) are not directly related to the suppression of property prices, and can't be attributed to any of these entities. In other words, it is the greedy speculators/so-called investors/selfish speculators who are the main cause of the super-high property prices that are having a devastating impact on the livelihood of the public. As the increase of the US Federal Reserve's interest rate level is inversely proportional to the fluctuation of Hong Kong's property prices, the higher the US/US dollar bank interest rate, the more suppressed Hong Kong's property prices are. When the US Fed lowers interest rates between 2020 and 2021 (until early 2022) (the Fed's interest rate drop from 1.41 in January 2018 to 0.05% in April 2020 set off the biggest real estate speculation in Hong Kong's history, which is entirely consistent with the changes in the data described above; furthermore, the introduction of the National Security Act was not a factor in suppressing property prices at all), Hong Kong property prices will not be able to move up and down regardless of those. In spite of all these events and policy factors, property prices in Hong Kong have soared and recorded a record high. Therefore, to withdraw or not to withdraw is to follow the US Federal Reserve's interest rate up and down. The problem with removing the anti-speculation tax is that the more speculators own and dispose of the higher priced flats, the more profit they make. At the same time, the Hong Kong government's stamp duty will be reduced by the same percentage.
Admittedly, the biggest beneficiaries of the withdrawal of the anti-speculation tax are the top real estate speculators, such as the 36 top speculators who own more than 101 properties. The withdrawal is a specialized transfer of benefits to the rich and powerful speculators, as well as a self-interested conflict of interest between the speculators themselves, Paul Chan, and the bureaucrats. However, the 1,653,963 or so owners of just one unit (mostly owner-occupiers) are potential profit makers. The vast majority of the rest of the Hong Kong population who are not owners have nothing to gain. The removal of the tax demonstrates that the so-called official slogans of 'resolving deep-seated contradictions' and 'solving the housing problem once and for all' have been reduced to falsehood. This is because removing the anti-speculation tax to kick-start another long-term speculative trend runs completely counter to the policy direction of 'resolving deep-seated contradictions'. On February 28, 2024, the Financial Secretary, Paul Chan (VICTORWOOD DEVELOPMENT LIMITED), who is a speculator himself (a beneficiary of the withdrawal of the anti-speculation tax), announced the withdrawal of the tax in response to the selfish request of the hegemonic real estate speculators' group. The drums and evil winds of removing the tax have been going on for a long time between 2020 and 2021, the peak of property price records in history, in order to further inflate the already super-high property prices to sky-high prices, but the conspiracy failed completely (with the Russian-Ukrainian war and the Fed's gradual increase in the long-term interest rate from 0.08 in March 2022, Hong Kong's property prices, such as the Private Property Price Index (PPI) and the month-to-month change, have gradually been suppressed in line with the former's adjustment). Apart from withdrawing the tax confirming that the Hong Kong government is still a real estate developer's government, and completely abandoning the policy of 'resolving deep-seated contradictions', the Hong Kong government has lost, and would rather abandon, the hearts and minds of the people who make up the total population. In short, the Five Eyes Coalition does not need to spend any money on black ops or economic sanctions against the Hong Kong government, because the Hong Kong government specializes in serving the greedy speculators' class, and as a result of its blundering and inability to influence, the majority of other people's hearts and minds will automatically deviate and cause people's livelihoods to deteriorate. Withdrawal of the tax is a point of no return, a complete abandonment of resolving deep-seated conflicts. The opposite direction is to lower ultra-high property prices to an affordable level for the grassroots, to consolidate the reduction of ultra-high rents and ultra-high prices to unleash local productivity, business vitality and purchasing power. This is what is meant by the so-called transformation of the economic model. At present, attracting investment and importing cheap workers are both old modes of maintaining vested interests, which are very passive, and even the former is often eventually reduced to a real estate project, while the latter is meant to alleviate the social pressure of improving the welfare of local workers. Neither of them is beneficial to the local working class. Not to mention that the mega events/public relations (the so-called mega event economy, where the government spends public money on large scale commercial/public relations events on behalf of the oligarchs, whereas public relations and mega events are supposed to be self-funded by the business sector, individual corporations) without any real reform of the economic model, as well as the importation of large numbers of mainlanders who have changed their consumption patterns, are also just a big, empty flowerpot.
▪️俗稱財赤預算案的財政預算案2024年，其中事前未透露的炒家惠利是房地產信託基金上的新自由主義措施。即豁免房地產信託基金(Real Estate Investment Trust；REIT)單位轉讓和期權（香港交易所期權市場現有3類市場莊家： · 恒生指數期權、恒生中國企業指數期權、恒生科技指數期權及指定的股票期權均設有主要莊家計劃）莊家（能影響金融證券市場行情的大户投資者）證券經銷業務的印花稅。房地產信託基金顯示地產炒家也就是炒股炒家。炒樓炒股往往是一致的。甚至不擁有投機物業的人也可以透過房地產信託基金（如領展房地產投資信託基金和長實的泓富產業信託）擁有的各種物業進行地產投機並從超高租金獲利。因此，陳茂波向地產寡頭的房地產信託基金也輸送了深厚的利益，除了撤辣以外，直接豁免了房地產信託基金投機有關的印花稅。這也凸顯了港府的階級性質和它服務的政治主體（本港頂層的炒家階層）。此措施就會激發超高租金的趨勢（拜香港樓價所賜，香港的產業信託曾一度佔全球產業信託總市值近1.5%）。
The Budget 2024, commonly known as the Budget Deficit Budget Plan, in which the undisclosed speculator benefits are neoliberal measures on REITs. That is, exempting Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) unit transfers and options (there are currently three types of market makers in the options market of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange: - Hang Seng Index Options, Hang Seng China Enterprises Index Options, Hang Seng Technology Index Options, and Designated Stock Options, all of which are equipped with major market maker schemes) from stamp duty on the securities' distribution business of the market makers (large investors who can influence the market price of financial securities). Stamp duty on securities dealing business (investors). REITs show that real estate speculators are also stock speculators. Property speculation is often the same as stock speculation. Even people who do not own speculative properties can engage in real estate speculation and profit from ultra-high rents on a wide range of properties owned by REITs, such as The Link REIT and CKI's Prosperity REIT. Therefore, Paul CHAN has also transferred profound benefits to the REITs of the real estate oligarchs by directly exempting the stamp duty related to REIT speculation, in addition to withdrawing the anti-speculation tax. This also highlights the class nature of the Hong Kong Government and the political subject it serves (the top speculator class in Hong Kong). This measure will then fuel the trend of ultra-high rents (thanks to Hong Kong's property prices, Hong Kong's REITs once accounted for nearly 1.5% of the world's total REIT market capitalization).
▪️內地或中央政府或中國共產黨與陳茂波及其撤辣措施毫無關係。該政策或該無策或該失策（背叛解決深層次矛盾的國策方針）的責任純粹歸於身為本港唯一地主的港府庸官自己（本港唯一地主是港府，而非中共或中央政府；本港的物業擁有者分為唯一地主的港府和業主們，因此，在本港，地主概念只能準確用在港府身上）。內地隨即否定了跟從香港撤除內地的房地產稅。即內地統治階級清楚本港或內地樓價低迷的原因並非稅收本身，同時明確表態不跟從港府和本港港統治階級有關撤辣的措施和政策方向了。‘在調控房地產時，內地會綜合考慮調控對於稅收、地方財政以及上下游產業鏈等影響。基於這個角度，內地不太可能全面退出稅收來穩樓市。’ 與全球強化反地產投機稅來抑制境外投機份子的趨勢正相反（如加拿大， 加國移民增 推辣招抑樓價和新加坡 新加坡樓市加辣 外國人買樓印花稅倍增1倍至60% ），本港在此議題上完全孤立，為維持已失去生命力的地產霸權炒樓炒股泡沫經濟模式而徹底去除反投機稅來激發新一股炒風了。港府完全把本地需首置的多數派民意棄之不顧，這才會醞釀反修例風波級的未來政治後果。最鮮明的政治後果是，當中美矛盾更激化到軍事衝突之時，港府就無法政治動員總人口，也無法形成後方。還是僅能勉強透過組織義務動員最多七分之一人口（烏合之眾）而已。只要沒有民心支持（人民不信賴這個政府），社會和政權就會變得薄弱和分裂，而鳥獸散。當政府需要大部分民眾的支持時，已夠受苦和厭煩其失策和無策的民眾則自然會在敵人面前敵對政府。這是理所當然的，也不能怪民眾。所謂民眾就是政府的政策。不難預測，社會多數人口（legion）的民怨會找到它適當的敘事，意識形態和方式來再度會現形。港府撤辣不但徹底放棄了解決深層次矛盾，也徹底背棄了反修例風波的教訓。最終實現的則是這一切一連串的政治事件背後一直都在經營本港政治劇場的地產霸權炒家階層的慾望。那麼，撤辣的適當時機本來應該是樓價水平回到孫九招出台前的2002年10月的水平。
The Mainland or the Central Government or the Chinese Communist Party had nothing to do with Paul CHAN and his removal of the anti-speculation tax. The responsibility for the policy's failure or miscalculation (betrayal of the national policy direction of resolving deep-seated conflicts) rests solely with the Hong Kong government quacks themselves as the sole landlord of Hong Kong (the sole landlord of Hong Kong is the Hong Kong government, not the Chinese Communist Party or the Central Government, and the property owners in Hong Kong are divided between the Hong Kong government, which is the sole landlord, and the property owners, and therefore the concept of landlord in Hong Kong can only be accurately used in the context of the Hong Kong government). The Mainland then denied following Hong Kong's lead in removing the Mainland's real estate tax. That is to say, the ruling class in the Mainland knew clearly that the reason for the downturn in property prices in Hong Kong or in the Mainland was not the tax itself, and at the same time made it clear that they would not follow the Hong Kong Government's and Hong Kong's ruling class's measures and policy directions regarding the removal of the tax. In regulating the real estate sector, the Mainland will take into account the impact of the regulation on tax revenue, local finances and the upstream and downstream industrial chains, etc. In this regard, the Mainland is unlikely to follow the policy direction of the Hong Kong Government and the ruling class in Hong Kong. Based on this perspective, it is unlikely that the Mainland will completely withdraw taxes to stabilize the property market.'' Contrary to the global trend of strengthening anti-property speculation tax to curb foreign speculators (e.g. Canada, Canada's immigrants increase, Singapore's property market is more aggressive, Singapore has increased the stamp duty on foreigners' property purchases by doubling the stamp duty by one to 60%), Hong Kong is completely isolated on this issue, and has completely removed the anti-speculation tax to stimulate a new wave of speculation in order to maintain the bubble economic model of property speculation by the hegemony of the real estate sector, which has already lost its vitality. The Hong Kong government has completely ignored the public opinion of the majority of the local people who need to buy their first homes, and this is what will brew the future political consequences of the same scale of the anti-amendment storm. The most obvious political consequence is that when the conflict between China and the US intensifies to the point of military conflict, the Hong Kong government will not be able to politically mobilize the total population, and will not be able to form a rearguard. It can barely mobilize one-seventh of the population (the rabble) by organizing scarecrows. As long as there is no popular support (people do not trust this government), society and the regime will become weak and divided, and the birds and beasts will scatter. When the government needs the support of the majority of the people, those who have suffered enough and are tired of its mistakes and ineptitude will naturally turn against the government in the face of its enemies. This is natural, and the people are not to blame. The people are the government's policies. It is not difficult to predict that the grievances of the legion will find their proper narratives, ideologies and ways to resurface. Not only has the Hong Kong government completely given up on resolving the deep-rooted conflicts, it has also completely abandoned the lessons learned from the anti-amendment controversy. The ultimate realization is the desire of the hegemonic real estate speculators who have been running the political theater of Hong Kong behind this series of political events. In that case, the right time to withdraw the anti-speculation tax would have been to bring property prices back to the level of October 2002 before the introduction of SUEN's nine strokes.
▪️首先，市民看得清楚港府自稱的房屋供應量只不過是估計，畫餅充飢，講的只不過是可能性（所謂‘可達’）而已。在實際上，本港房屋供應量顯著減少，如政府數據顯示，私人住宅動工量顯著減少，由2020年的21,495伙跌至2022年的12,254伙（URL）。甚至，仲量聯行發佈的《香港住宅銷售市場綜述》，預期2026至2028年的私人住宅落成量將較2023至2025年期間減少44%。這與財赤預算案的願景正相反。撤辣不是只有二手樓市場有關，一手樓也有關，是因為炒家們也搶購一手樓做新的投機物業。就整體的樓價趨勢，香港沒有較可靠的一手樓的樓價指數，而主要参看的是，涵蓋面最大的港府差餉物業估價署的香港物業售價指數（PRICE INDICES FOR HONG KONG PROPERTY MARKET），地產代理商龍頭中原地產的中原城市領先指數以及另一寡佔該市場的，美聯的美聯樓價指數。東方日報還不時以所謂十大屋苑（即港島：太古城｜海怡半島 ｜康怡花園；九龍：黃埔花園｜美孚新邨｜麗港城｜新都城；新界：嘉湖山莊 ｜ 第一城；離島：映灣園）的個別交易情況當新聞。最後，對每位市民而言，特定屋苑的特定單位的交易紀錄也提供樓價的參考數據。本港普遍使用的英式呎價（price per square foot）來看特定平方尺（實用面積）的單位大小的樓價。如304呎乘實用面積的呎價12,697HKD=約386萬港幣的該單位樓價。而媒體通常只講該呎價而已。這還要個別看特定單位的特定實用面積來判斷其特定樓價。
除了新私人樓房的供應中該地產霸權四大寡頭加上會德豐地產佔據相當比率外，就地產代理業市場，中原地產及其旗下利嘉閣地產，其對手美聯集團及其旗下香港置業寡占80，90%市場佔有率（一手樓花銷售時，四大代理公司（中原、美聯、利嘉閣、港置）等合共市佔率高達8至9成，認為競爭法不想大持份者合謀定價，令消費者失去議價及講價權利。URL）。其中，中原和美聯至今單獨佔據20到30%的市場佔有率。就中原和美聯的所謂樓價指數都現在採取的是加權平均數（weighted index; 恆指也是加權平均數，而非平均數），基於各別抽樣成交個案的總體（中原：其處理的138個成份屋苑；美聯：其處理的143個著名中小型私人屋苑的成交個案）的特定樓宇的總市值（其售價和交易量的總和及其平均數加上做出加權調整；加權是為了減低單位質素差異對屋苑呎價變動的影響，即所謂調整呎價。其產生的平面化的效果，使指數表現出來的波幅較少，升幅和跌幅都會比實際少，以免對個別交易的質素差異影響其整體市值）。
雖然中原和美聯涵蓋的二手樓市場的樓價指數是有關部分樓宇的，但是它們的樓價指數的圖表波動與差餉物業估價署的香港物業售價指數的圖表波動大體一致。此三者確實反映本港樓價指數的走勢。本港樓價最高峰是2021年的約400點（1997年為100點），目前從2022年初美國聯儲局逐漸調高利率以來只降到2017年的高水平而已。有一個法則是當美國聯儲局調高利率的時候，本港樓價則以同等比率受壓，反之亦然。美國銀行利率高，資本就踴躍跑進美元銀行存款獲利，在國際上構成強美元政策，而國際資本較不積極把本地房地產當作畜財投機工具。
First, the public can see clearly that the housing supply claimed by the Hong Kong Government is only an estimate, a pie in the sky, which is only a possibility (the so-called 'achievable'). In reality, the supply of housing in Hong Kong has dropped significantly. For example, government figures show that the number of private residential units started has dropped significantly, from 21,495 units in 2020 to 12,254 units in 2022. Even the "Hong Kong Residential Sales Market Review" published by Jones Lang LaSalle expects that the number of private residential completions from 2026 to 2028 will decrease by 44% compared to the period from 2023 to 2025. This is exactly the opposite of the vision of the Budget. The withdrawal of the tax is not only related to the second-hand property market, but also the first-hand property market, because speculators are also snapping up first-hand flats as new speculative properties. In terms of the overall property price trend, there is no reliable index for first-hand flats in Hong Kong. Instead, the main reference is the PRICE INDICES FOR HONG KONG PROPERTY MARKET of the Rating and Valuation Department (RVD), which is the largest in terms of coverage, the Centa-City Leading Index of Centaline Property, which is the leading real estate agent, and the Midland's Midland Price Index, which is also the most dominant one in the market. The Oriental Daily News also reported from time to time on the individual transactions of the so-called top 10 housing estates (that is, Hong Kong Island: Taikoo Shing, South Horizons, Kornhill, Kowloon: Whampoa Garden, Mei Foo Sun Chuen, Laguna City, Metro City, New Territories: Kingswood Villas, City One, and outlying islands: Caribbean Coast) as part of the news.
Finally, for each member of the public, the transaction records of specific flats in specific estates also provide reference data on property prices. Price per square foot is a commonly used term in Hong Kong to look at the price of a particular size of flat on a particular square footage (salable area). For example, the price per square foot of a 304 sq ft flat multiplied by its salable area price per sq foot is 12,697HKD = about 3.86 million HKD for that flat. The media usually only talk about the price per square foot. It is also important to look at the specific saleable area of a particular unit to determine its specific price. Apart from the fact that the hegemonic Big Four plus Wheelock Properties account for a significant proportion of the supply of new private housing, the real estate agency market is dominated by Centaline and its subsidiary Ricacorp Properties, and its rival Midland Group and its subsidiary Hongkong Land, with an oligopoly of 80 to 90% of the market when it comes to first-hand uncompleted flats, which is a very important factor in the market. The competition law does not want the major stakeholders to collude in price setting, which deprives consumers of the right to bargain and negotiate. Among them, Centaline and Midland alone account for 20 to 30% of the market share so far. Both Centaline and Midland's so-called property price indices are now weighted averages (the Hang Seng Index is also a weighted average, not an average), based on the total market value (the sum and average of the selling prices and transaction volumes of the 138 constituent estates handled by Centaline; 143 by Midland) of specific flats in the aggregate of the respective sampled transactions, weighted to minimize the impact of differences in quality on the price per square foot of the flats in the estates. The weighting is to minimize the impact of differences in flat quality on changes in the price per square foot of the housing estates, i.e. the so-called adjustment of the price per square foot. The flattening effect is such that the indexes show less volatility, with both upward and downward movements being less than the actual ones, so that differences in the quality of individual transactions do not affect their overall market value. Although the price indices of the secondary market covered by Centaline and Midland are for some properties, the graphical fluctuations of their price indices are broadly in line with the graphical fluctuations of the Hong Kong Property Price Indices compiled by the Rating and Valuation Department (RVD). These three indices do reflect the trend movements of the property price indices in Hong Kong. Hong Kong's property prices peaked at about 400 points in 2021 (compared to 100 points in 1997), and have now only fallen to high levels in 2017 since the US Federal Reserve's gradual increase in interest rates in early 2022. One rule of thumb is that when the US Fed raises interest rates, property prices in Hong Kong are under pressure at the same rate, and vice versa. With high interest rates in US banks, capital is eager to enter US dollar bank deposits for profits, which constitutes a strong US dollar policy in the international arena, while international capital is less active in treating local real estate as a tool for speculation on finance.
香港物業售價指數（PRICE INDICES FOR HONG KONG PROPERTY MARKET）
2. 中原城市領先 指數 (Centa-City Leading Index)
3. 美聯樓價指數 (Midland Market Property Price Chart)
4. Federal Funds Effective Rate, or the interest rate
5. 本土研究社：1999年至2023年間樓價可負擔性 (LRC: Affordability of Property Prices between 1999 and 2023)
依照這些本港樓價指數及其圖表波動的相一致性，目前要觀察的是會否投機激化到2021年的史上最高峰甚或超過那個點。不過，不能期待陳茂波會採取資產增值稅，空置稅，重啟辣招等諸措施來抵制本港炒家階層的炒樓投機活動。再度強調，本港超高樓價至少應該降低到2002年11月孫九招出台前的水平。
Based on the consistency of these indices and their graphical fluctuations, what remains to be seen is whether speculation will intensify to the all-time high of 2021 or even beyond that point. However, one cannot expect Paul Chan to use measures such as capital gains tax, vacancy tax, and the reintroduction of the anti-speculation tax, etc., to counteract the speculative activities of Hong Kong's speculative class. Once again, it should be emphasized that Hong Kong's ultra-high property prices should at least be reduced to the level of October 2002, before the introduction of SUEN's nine strokes.
🔻 NEWS / FACTs 【事實關係】
▪️貴租經濟？ 研究員接受訪問，認為過往金光閃閃銷售侈奢品嘅名店已不似再復見，係可預視嘅將來亦不會重返，以高物價維持嘅地租經濟模式，已現崩潰跡象。而係未來進一步區域化下，深圳與香港融合，香港沒有獨特性，現時資產價格已明顯過高。唯一出路，是大幅減租。URL
▪️財政預算案2024下周三（28日）發表，中原集團創辦人施永青周二（20日）在新春記招表示港府若不撤辣，社會將要面對資產大量蒸發風險，消費意欲及投資能力都被破壞，當中各種「政治後果」不是政府可以承擔。施永青今日（21日）在電台節目再稱，現時樓價下跌是整個社會判斷，強調房地產不健康會影響經濟民生，要求撤辣而非減辣，又稱若不撤辣問責官員都要承受政治後果，「下任特首唔搵你做財政司司長，或者下屆特首都選唔到你做咪就係政治後果。」URL
▪️摩根大通發表研究報告指，政府將於2月28日公布財政預算案。該行預計基本情況下，進一步降低額外印花稅稅率。而因應許持份者呼籲，政府亦有可能完全撤辣。然而，該行認為由於房地產市場較受利率及經濟和股市信心所帶動，料撇辣僅在短期內刺激成交，並不能扭轉樓價下跌趨勢。 摩通表示，先前的減辣措施沒有帶動香港地產股股價，不過，如果政府完全撤辣則會是一個上行驚喜，預計屆時股價將於短期內造好，建議投資者趁勢沽售，並解釋是相信措施無法持續扭轉樓市跌勢。URL
▪️匯豐(HSBC Global Research)發表報告，對2月28日公布的港府財政預算案作前瞻預測，指房屋政策會是焦點，料很大機會將撤辣，最少持續性減辣。穩定樓市將有助推動投資情緒及支持地產股及銀行股價。因此認為港股中地產、金融及建築股將帶來機會。URL
▪️福布斯指，在旅遊業和消費成長的推動下，香港經濟2023年增長3.2%，但由於房地產業停滯和出口低迷，疫情後復甦仍比預期慢。同時，IPO新股上市荒，恒指自上次公布排行榜以來下跌28%，而榜上的50大富豪財富整體下跌9%，至2960億美元。整體而言，榜上50位富豪中，30人的身家都縮水，包括首富李嘉誠。而身家減少最多的，是梳化及床上用品製造商敏華控股的創辦人黃敏利，受內地需求放緩影響，其財富縮水逾三分之一，至20億美元，是今年按百分比計的最大跌幅。URL
▪️政府宣布，即日起全面撤辣，即由今天起所有住宅物業交易無須再繳付額外印花稅、買家印花稅和新住宅印花稅。政府認為在當前的經濟及市場情況下，有關措施已無需要。URL
▪️面對樓價全年跌7%、交投跌5%至4.3萬宗的低水平，加上業界的熱切期盼，新一份財政預算案宣佈「樓市全面撤辣」即日生效，即由今天起所有住宅物業交易無須再繳付額外印花稅（SSD）、買家印花稅（BSD）和新住宅印花稅（前稱雙倍印花稅DSD）。受消息刺激地產股全面上漲，新世界（017）現報10.38元，升5.92%；新地（016）現報80.05元，升3.29%；長實（1113）現報37.7元，升2.86%；恒地（012）現報23.1元，升4.05%；信和置業（083）現報8.57元，升2.63%。會德豐地產副主席兼常務董事黃光耀認為措施能夠積極推動香港經濟動力及信心，有助房地產的長遠發展。他認為去年施政報告的「先免後徵」，透過專才計劃，為香港樓市注入新動力，而今次「撤辣」能夠真實反映市場置業需求，刺激本地人及海外人士置業自用，並吸引投資者重投物業投資市場，指集團將配合市場氣氛、會積極籌備集團新盤推售。
▪️財政司司長周三（28日）宣布新一份《財政預算案》，且「樓市全撤辣」。金管局隨即發表新措施，包括3,000萬以下的自用住宅按揭成數上調至七成，以及即時停按揭壓測。URL
▪️預算案公布後地產股急升，業界亦認為政府回應訴求，被問到為何政府不幫助首次置業者上車。政府指金融管理局同時間放寬買樓按揭成數，政府房屋政策下未來幾年資助房屋供應會盡力增加，但政府指做地需要時間，因此供應未必在此階段能夠立刻供應，政府保證在住宅供應市場，不管是出租公屋還是不同形式的資助出售房屋，力度均會達標。URL
▪️樓市全面撤辣，買家置業成本即時降低，其中以公司名義入市的買家、以及非專才計劃下的海外買家最為受惠，以購置價值800萬港元的住宅單位為例，可即時慳稅近百萬元。上述兩類買家在撤辣前，需支付買家印花稅及新住宅從價印花稅，稅率合共為樓價15%，涉及稅額120萬元。撤辣後，則只需支付樓價3%的第二標準從價印花稅，即24萬元，稅項金額前後相差96萬元，少付12%稅額。購買第二個單位的本地客亦可受惠，同樣購買800萬元住宅單位為例，撤辣前需繳付樓價7.5%的新住宅從價印花稅，稅額為60萬元。現時則只要支付24萬元、即樓價3%的第二標準從價印花稅，少付4.5%稅額，慳稅36萬元。
至於首次置業的本地客、以及原先已受惠於「先免後徵」的專才買家，是次撤辣則未有特別受惠。URL
▪️事實上，如果在撤辣前買家以公司名義入市要支付樓價15%辣稅，以上述單位作價計算，涉及稅項約118.5萬元，而撤辣後，陳永傑現時只需付樓價3%印花稅，只需繳付23.7萬元稅項，即慳94.8萬元。URL
▪️對於西九一旦落實賣地，會否在市況低迷時「推冧市」，唐英年形容這種說法「無知」，指西九目前並不急於賣地，最快可能要到2026/27年才會沽售，有信心香港的經濟可跟隨內地穩步發展，到2026/27年，樓市應有一定程度上揚，屆時會按市場情況沽售。URL
▪️樓市撤辣下，不少市民擔心更難置業，被問到發展商一旦不放售單位影響樓價，政府有何對策，陳茂波指一旦市場失效和過度熾熱，隨時可以調整措施，極端情況下可引入空置稅，但目前遠遠沒有需要，亦沒有引入空置稅的硬性指標，會密切監控市場情況。URL
▪️「辣招」中的額外印花稅是針對業主在購入物業短期內出售所設置的印花稅，
而買家印花稅是針對境外買家的印花稅，非香港永久性居民在香港置業需要繳付額外印花稅；
新住宅印花稅是針對非首次置業的買家設定的額外印花稅。URL
▪️市場關注的還在於，對於此次香港樓市全面「撤辣」行為，內地樓市會不會效仿？
對此，廣東省城鄉規劃院住房政策研究中心首席研究員李宇嘉表示，香港是自由港，對房地產市場主要調整措施就是稅收和金融手段，其政策出發點是基於物業價值穩定和資本流入流出。「去辣」能極大降低交易成本和持有成本，對於吸引包括內地在內的全球資金都有極大幫助。在調控房地產時，內地會綜合考慮調控對於稅收、地方財政以及上下游產業鏈等影響。基於這個角度，內地不太可能全面退出稅收來穩樓市。李宇嘉表示，內地房地產稅收佔到總稅收收入的20%左右，相關產業鏈結合在一起佔到30%以上，地方依賴度較大，不太可能撤去。而且，內地樓市低迷的根本原因在於供求關係逆轉、舊模式不可持續，不在於稅收。在樓市供求關係逆轉後，即便利率降到歷史最低，即便熱點城市增值稅免徵期收縮，也難阻擋樓市下行。URL
🔻 COMMENT 【評語】
撤辣過後被棄之不顧的深層次矛盾:港府單方面決定撤辣是不歸路，徹底背棄了解決深層次矛盾的政策方針。但，內地和中央政府並不跟從香港撤辣之舉。甚至，與港府帶頭促進拆除動態清零防疫措施來當作克服疫情一樣，拆除反地產投機稅來當作解決了房屋問題，實現了地產健康發展？是一樣膚淺的官方邏輯。本港喪失的則是本港困苦在超高樓價的絕大多數民眾對政權的信賴以及解決深層次矛盾的條件。
The Hong Kong Government's unilateral decision of the withdrawal of the anti-speculation tax is a point of no return, and it has completely abandoned the policy objective of resolving the deep-seated contradictions in Hong Kong. However, the Mainland and the Central Government have not followed Hong Kong's move to withdraw the real estate tax. Even just as the Hong Kong government took the lead in promoting the removal of the dynamic zero anti-epidemic measures as a pretentious way to overcome the epidemic, the removal of the anti-property speculation tax is regarded as a pretentious 'solution' to the housing problem and a realization of the healthy development of the real estate sector? It is the same shallow bureaucratic sophistry. What Hong Kong has lost is the trust of the vast majority of the people of Hong Kong, who are trapped in the midst of super-high property prices, in the inept regime and in the disappearing conditions for resolving deep-seated contradictions.
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