Open-source intelligence (OSINT)
The Chief Executive's Policy Address 2024: Reforms Entrusted to Vested Interests
🔻 COMMENT 【評語】既得利益勢力受託改革
無論多麼不願意或多麼乏味，我身為香港永久市民都認真聽完李家超的立法會演講和親自讀完了全篇李家超第三份《行政長官2024年施政報告》。在一個官僚專制的非民主社會，施政報告不是提交給人民的，而是提交給上級官僚機構受批准的。因此，也不是人民監督，而是特首監督其屬下官僚施政。從人民，即佔社會絕對多數的勞動者勤勞階級的立場來看，該報告有幾個顯著重點：
1. 既得利益勢力受託改革: 首先，委託給既得利益勢力自己去解決既得利益勢力問題是個致命謬誤。該報告還是確認了一個事實，即本港毫無改革勢力可言。《行政長官2024年施政報告》的唯一亮點是，《中共中央關於進一步全面深化改革、推進中國式現代化的決定》中，涉港部分是所謂三個中心，一個高地而已，因此，本港既得利益勢力本來可以只‘應對’ 三個中心，一個高地的部分就足夠的。不過，既得利益勢力將新國策「新質生產力」引進為本港政策是在字面上正面的。建立和發展「新質生產力」是所謂改革的核心。但魔鬼在細節，附件針對「新質生產力」無KPI。甚至，既得利益勢力把「新質生產力」與一般工業比率等同起來。甚至，他們敷衍說，只想把「新質生產力」（本港把它與工業一般比率混淆）從1%提高到3或5%而已。換言之，「新質生產力」的發展是刻意被限制在不影響以往地產霸權模式的微小比率而已。然而，「新質生產力」是只有提高到35%（台灣）或40%（深圳）水平時，才算基於「新質生產力」的再工業化（新質工業化）的完成。在報告始終，港府本身的角色只是個統治階級的提款機。
2. 關於改革，招商引資，在‘執行’上普遍依賴的種種外判，在各個部門正常業務範疇和框架內的加減等純量化的調節都不算什麼改革。如‘提升’‘加強’‘支援’‘資助’‘推行’‘推廣’‘聯繫’‘舉辦’‘推動’‘增設’‘優化’‘諮詢’‘研究’‘提交’等，《行政長官2024年施政報告》在整篇使用的詞彙都是屬於本來各部門正常業務上的可加可減的調節或程序而已，而非什麼改革。改革一詞實在被李家超的公關濫用了。簡單地說，如果李家超從上任以來推動的都是改革，就沒有人特別提出要求所謂銳意改革的。還有有些人希望的所謂政改是全然沒有的，而在所謂「治理改革」上只有增設管理職和部門來惠及自己友而已。再加上，財政赤字的補償或平衡措施是完全不在《行政長官2024年施政報告》裏面。報告中，有趣的是，連整個食環署的部分也都缺乏。有一個部分是整篇的縮圖。如：「附件57.在2028 年底前將維港兩岸的海濱長廊的總長度延長不少於30%，即由2022 年的25 公里延長至34 公里，及每年於海濱場地舉行不少於30 項活動。（發展局）」。這就是貫穿《行政長官2024年施政報告》的內在邏輯。接下來，它們再花幾年延長9公里。以此類推，直至世代交替。這正是典型的本港施政風格。足認本港既得利益勢力最大的武器或反抗力不是反對派，而是極具破壞性的拖延，超時（往往加上，超支）。這也主要是量化的，而非框架和實質的轉變。有兩大因素在支撐，即中共絕不問責港府失策，以及港府失策繼續讓民怨沸騰也只會證明他們愛戴的港英時期的輝煌，反正香港市民多數仍是戀殖的。在政治學上，本港結構主義的陷阱已嚴重固化了政治思維。簡言之，「只要所謂反對派陣營講的都是錯誤，而只要是所謂建制派陣營講的都正確，或相反。」這些都已陷入了在意識形態上，本港既得利益勢力所設下和經營的顏色政治結構。重點是，既得利益勢力核心是在創造，利用和剝削所謂反對派的同時仍保持其自身的建制權貴地位的資本大聯盟。那麼，改革應該是針對本港既得利益勢力精確開刀的。然而，在《行政長官2024年施政報告》裏面，只有保護和鞏固既得利益勢力的論述而已。而根本欠缺任何挑戰既得利益勢力的措施可言。哪有反壟斷？一點都沒有。改革？的確，有很多很多「改革」在該報告裡面。李家超的這一句最具代表既得利益勢力的心聲：「因基礎和體制可能不同，不能盲目照抄。改革方案要因時制宜，因地制宜。」（第一頁）這就是說，香港可以不採取全國統一性的國策。如此給予既得利益勢力安全空間了。在此，香港這個廣東省南端的彈丸之地成為了獨立於國策的特殊政策真空地帶。可以不採取國策的特權是一國兩制？這樣，全國統一性何在？從李家超的這一句中，充分體現了本港既得利益勢力固化藩籬的本色。「可以是不同」和「違抗」的差別是令人質疑和可爭議的。這就是香港土著的政治特色。
3. 房屋政策。普遍的盲點之一是，令人費解和誤導的累積供應量。如「在2024-25 至2027-28 年度分階段提早落成約10 000 個公屋單位，最終達至2023-24 至2032-33 年度提早落成約14 000 個公屋單位，讓公屋申請者提早上樓。（房屋局）」要注意的是，這個14 000 個包括之前年度的10 000 個在內。因此，最終實際增加的預估值只不過是4 000 個公屋單位。換言之，未來大量供應之說是誇大其詞，是因為曾被揭發經營分間單位出租業的財政司司長「偉活發展有限公司」先生和其手下「簡約公屋」小姐都是炒家家庭要保護炒家利益的。房屋政策會怎樣？只要看他們的階級性質，就會不言自明。其實，港府身為既得利益勢力守護神，「告別劏房」不僅是以改名即時得逞的，也是合法化「劏房」（不適切居所/違章建築/僭建物）來實際分為優質劏房和劣質劏房。其登記出租制度也仍不會設定起始租金基準。所謂「簡樸房」（Basic Housing Unit, BHU）是劏房，也就是劏房被定義為本港基本單位。這樣，既得利益勢力徹底推翻了社會的正常價值觀。貪婪劏房炒家們都不但享受（裝修和租賃）津貼，合法身分，也藉以《行政長官2024年施政報告》順水推舟，加租。結局，到底幫了劏房受害弱勢群體還是貪婪炒家不動產資本，這是明白的。此外，香港媒體和所謂社團，慈善團體開記者會，叫劏房戶訴苦說「劏房被取締後，就會無家可歸。」這其實是資本要的鏡頭。那一句根本不在劏房戶的利益。而是劏房業主用以為吸盡政府津貼鋪路而已。幾乎沒有任何勢力在幫劏房受害弱勢群體的場景登場了。最後，「鱷魚淚」林健鋒說：「我們不可以令樓市一潭死水，我們要樓市活。樓市不活，工商借貸不活，很多東西都不活。」此次它代表的香港總商會-經民聯一直遊說的短視政策完全被實現了。即優化「新資本投資者入境計劃 — 即日起，容許投資住宅物業，該物業成交價須為5,000 萬元或以上，投資於房地產獲計算入投資總額上限為1,000 萬元。另外，明年3 月1 日起，透過申請人全資擁有的合資格私人公司的投資可計入合資格投資金額內。」（第九頁）以及『再推「還息不還本」 容許「中小企融資擔保計劃」的借款企業（包括就現有在八成、九成和百分百特別擔保產品下已批出的貸款，以及在八成和九成信貸擔保產品下新造貸款）申請最多12 個月「還息不還本」，並將八成和九成信貸擔保產品的最長貸款擔保期分別延長至十年和八年，同時向兩種擔保產品下新造貸款提供「部分本金還款」選項。』（第三十六頁），「考慮到最新經濟及金融環境，在繼續維持銀行體系穩定的前提下，金管局將放寬住宅物業的按揭貸款條件，不論物業價值、是否自用或公司持有以及買家是否「首置」，按揭成數上限一律調整至七成，供款與入息比率上限一律調整為五成。至於非住宅物業，有關按揭成數上限及供款與入息比率上限亦會調整至同樣水平。」（第四十六頁）這三項短視政策都是既得利益勢力的果實，尤其是所謂真撤辣。如此，一面倒服務既得利益勢力的《行政長官2024年施政報告》根本敷衍了不成比例的勞工政策和毫無新意的少數族裔政策。
總之，一面倒服務既得利益勢力的《行政長官2024年施政報告》根本稱不上什麼改革。它最致命的是身為報告，始終它一點都並不提供問題分析，而片面地只羅列了以改革名義新包裝的正常業務的既有措施及其量化調節（可加可減，或小修小補）。如此，不但根本的認受性有問題，其制定措施的透明度和針對性也都成疑。譬如，種種津貼福利政策都往往不排除公務員自己及其家族利用，入息，資產限制也不透明，導致最需要政府救濟的弱勢群體無法有效得到救濟。
No matter how unwilling or boring it is, I, as a permanent citizen of Hong Kong, have listened attentively to Lee's Legislative Council speech and personally read the entirety of Lee's third Policy Address of the Chief Executive for the year 2024. In a non-democratic society characterized by bureaucratic dictatorship, policy addresses are not submitted to the people, but to the higher-level bureaucracy for approval. Therefore, it is not the people who supervise, but the Chief Executive who supervises the administration of the bureaucrats under him. From the standpoint of the people, i.e., the working class and industrious people who make up most society, the address has several notable points to make:
1. First, it is a fatal fallacy to entrust the problem of vested interests to the vested interests themselves. The Report still recognizes the fact that there is no reform force in Hong Kong to speak of. The only bright spot in the Chief Executive's 2024 Policy Address is that the part concerning Hong Kong in the Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Further Deepening the Reforms in a Comprehensive Manner and Promoting Chinese-style Modernization is the so-called “three centers, one highland”, so the forces of vested interests in Hong Kong could have just “responded” to the “three centers, one highland” part and that would have been enough. Therefore, the vested interests in Hong Kong could have 'dealt with' only three centers and one highland. However, it is literally positive for vested interests to introduce the new national policy of “new quality productivity” as a policy for Hong Kong. The establishment and development of “new quality productivity” is the core of the so-called reform. But the devil is in the details; the Annex has no KPIs for “new quality productivity”, and even vested interests have equated “new quality productivity” with the general industrial ratio. They even say perfunctorily that they only want to raise the “new quality productivity” (which Hong Kong confuses with the general industrial ratio) from 1% to 3% or 5%. In other words, the development of “new quality productivity” is deliberately limited to a tiny percentage that does not affect the previous pattern of real estate hegemony. However, the re-industrialization based on the “new quality productivity” (new quality industrialization) will only be completed when the “new quality productivity” is raised to the level of 35% (Taiwan) or 40% (Shenzhen). Throughout the report, the role of the Hong Kong government itself is only an ATM for the ruling class.
2. With regard to reforms, investment promotion, all kinds of outsourcing commonly relied on in 'implementation', and purely quantitative adjustments such as additions and deletions within the normal business scope and framework of various departments are not considered to be reforms. For example, 'upgrading', 'strengthening', 'supporting', 'subsidizing', 'implementing', 'promoting', 'publicizing', 'promote', 'liaise', 'organize', 'facilitate', 'enhance', 'support', 'subsidize', 'implement', 'create', 'optimize', 'consult', 'study', 'submit', and so on. The terms used throughout the CE's 2024 Policy Address are only adjustments or procedures that can be added or subtracted from the normal business of various departments, rather than any reforms. The word “reform” has been abused by Lee's public relations. To put it simply, if all that Lee has been promoting since he took office were reforms, no one would have asked for the so-called “reforms”. There is no such thing as political reform, as some people would like to see, and the so-called “governance reform” only involves the creation of new posts and departments for the benefit of its friends. Moreover, measures to compensate for or balance the fiscal deficit are not included in the Chief Executive's 2024 Policy Address at all. What is interesting about the report is that even the entire section of the Food and Environmental Hygiene Department (FEHD) is lacking. There is a section which is a thumbnail sketch of the whole piece. For example, “Annex 57. To extend the total length of the waterfront promenades on both sides of the Victoria Harbor by not less than 30% by 2028, i.e. from 25 km in 2022 to 34 km, and to organize not less than 30 activities at the waterfront venues each year. (Development Bureau)”. This is the logic that runs through the Chief Executive's Policy Address 2024. Next, it will take a few more years to extend another 9 km. And so on, until generations change. This is typical of Hong Kong's style of governance. It is recognized that the greatest weapon or resistance of the vested interests in Hong Kong is not the opposition, but the devastating delays, the overruns (and often, the cost overruns). Again, this is largely quantitative rather than a change in framework and substance. It is underpinned by two major factors: the CCP's absolute refusal to hold the Hong Kong government accountable for its blunders, and the fact that the government's blunders will only serve to prove the glory of their beloved British Hong Kong era even if the government continues to make the public angry, and that Hong Kong people remain mostly colonialist anyway. In political science, the pitfalls of Hong Kong's structuralism have seriously solidified political thinking. In short, “whatever the so-called opposition camp says is wrong, and whatever the so-called pro-establishment camp says is right, or vice versa”. All of this is mired in an ideologically colored political structure set up and run by vested interests in Hong Kong. The point is that at the heart of the vested interests is the capitalist coalition that creates and exploits the so-called opposition while maintaining its own position of establishment power. Reforms, then, should be targeted precisely at the vested interests in Hong Kong. However, in the Chief Executive's 2024 Policy Address, there is only talk of protecting and consolidating vested interests. There are no measures to challenge vested interests at all. Where is anti-monopolization? There is none. Reform? Indeed, there are many, many “reforms” in the report. This quote from Lee best represents what the vested interests have to say: “As the basis and system may be different, we cannot copy them blindly. Reform programs should be adapted to the time and place.” (Page 1) This means that Hong Kong can dispense with the adoption of a uniform national policy. This would give the vested interests a safe space. In this way, Hong Kong, a tiny place at the southern tip of Guangdong Province, became a special policy vacuum independent of national policy. Is the privilege of not adopting a national policy one country, two systems? In that case, where is the national unity? This sentence of LEE Ka-chiu's fully reflects the true nature of Hong Kong's vested interests in solidifying barriers. The difference between “can be different” and “disobedience” is questionable and controversial. This is a characteristic of Hong Kong's indigenous politics.
3. Housing policy. One of the common blind spots is the puzzling and misleading cumulative supply. For example, “To advance the production of about 10000 PRH flats by phases from 2024-25 to 2027-28, culminating in the early production of about 14000 PRH flats from 2023-24 to 2032-33, to enable PRH applicants to be allocated PRH flats earlier. (Housing Bureau)” It should be noted that the 14000 units include the 10000 units in the previous years. Therefore, the actual increase in the estimated number of PRH flats will only be 4000 in the end. In other words, the claim that there will be a large supply in the future is an exaggeration because the Financial Secretary, Mr. Victor Wood Development Company Limited, who has been exposed as operating a subdivision of flats for rent, and his subordinate, Ms. Simplex Public Housing is both families of speculators who are trying to protect the interests of the speculators. What will happen to the housing policy? It is self-evident if we look at the nature of their class. In fact, the Hong Kong Government, as the guardian of vested interests, has not only got its way by changing the name of subdivided units, but also legalized subdivided units (unsuitable dwellings/ unauthorized building works) to actually classify them into quality subdivided units and poor quality subdivided units. The registration and letting system still does not set any benchmark for the starting rent. The so-called “Basic Housing Unit” (BHU) is a subdivided unit, which means that subdivided units are defined as basic units in Hong Kong. In this way, vested interests have completely overthrown the normal values of society. Greedy speculators of subdivided units are not only enjoying subsidies (for renovation and rental) and legal status, they are also taking advantage of the Chief Executive's Policy Address 2024 to increase rents. In the end, it is clear whether the victims of subdivided units have been helped or the real estate capital of the greedy speculators has been lost. In addition, the Hong Kong media and the so-called societies and charitable organizations held a press conference and told the tenants of subdivided units to complain that “after the subdivided units are banned, they will be rendered homeless”. This is in fact what the capital wants to see. That sentence is not in the interest of the subdivided units. Rather, it is used by owners of subdivided units to pave the way for maximizing government subsidies. There is hardly any power to help the disadvantaged victims of subdivided units. Finally, Jeffrey Lam, the “crocodile tears”, said, “We cannot let the property market remain stagnant, we want it to live. If the property market is not revitalized, commercial and industrial lending will not be revitalized, and many other things will not be revitalized. The nearsighted policy that the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce (HKGCC) and the Hong Kong Economic and Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (HKEDA), of which it is a representative, have been lobbying for this time has been realized. That is to say, the optimization of the “New Capital Investment Entrant Scheme - with immediate effect, allowing investment in residential property, the transaction price of which must be $50 million or more, and investment in real estate is counted towards the total investment ceiling of $10 million. In addition, with effect from March 1 next year, investment made through an eligible private company wholly owned by the applicant may be counted towards the amount of the qualifying investment”. (page 9) and “Further ‘Interest Only’ Allow SME Financing Guarantee Scheme (SFGS) borrowers (including those with existing loans approved under the 80%, 90% and 100% special guarantee products, as well as those with new loans under the 80% and 90% guarantee products) to apply for ‘Interest Only’ for a maximum period of 12 months, and extend the maximum guarantee period for the 80% and 90% guarantee products to ten years and eight years respectively, as well as to apply for ‘Partial Principal Repayment’ for both types of guarantee. (page 36), “Taking into account the latest economic and financial environment, and on the premise of continuing to maintain banking stability, the HKMA will relax the mortgage lending criteria for residential properties by adjusting the loan-to-value ratio ceiling for mortgage loans to 70% and the loan-to-income ratio ceiling for mortgage loans to 50%, irrespective of the value of the property, whether the property is owner-occupied or owned by a company, and whether the buyer is a ‘first-time home buyer’. For non-residential properties, the relevant loan-to-value ratio and repayment-to-income ratio ceilings will also be adjusted to the same levels.” (page 46) These three nearsighted policies are the fruits of vested interests, especially the so-called real withdrawal of anti-speculation schemes. In this way, the CE's Policy Address 2024, which serves the vested interests unilaterally, is basically perfunctory in its disproportionate labor policies and uninspired ethnic minority policies.
All in all, the CE's 2024 Policy Address, which serves the vested interests one-sidedly, cannot be called a reform at all. The most fatal thing about it is that as a policy address, it does not provide any problem analysis at all, but only lists out the existing measures and their quantitative adjustments (which can be added, subtracted, or tinkered with) in the name of reforms and new packages of business as usual. In this way, not only is there a fundamental problem of legitimacy, but the transparency and specificity of the measures formulated are also questionable. For example, the various policies on allowances and benefits often do not exclude civil servants and their families from making use of them, and the income and asset limits are not transparent, resulting in the disadvantaged groups most in need of government relief not being able to receive it effectively.
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