The 2025 Annual Threat Assessment Review

Open-source intelligence (OSINT)

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🔻 IMPORTANT - The 2025 Annual Threat Assessment

▪️ The purpose of this article is to offer a concise commentary on the 2025 Annual Threat Assessment (ATA) from the vantage point of Hong Kong, China, following a thorough review of the comprehensive document. What constitutes an intelligence report, or IC, in general? It is a tool designed to support decision-makers in various sectors in addressing national security challenges of diverse nature, while the IC, in its broader sense, does not function as a policymaker. As articulated in the Universal Principle: This 2025 Annual Threat Assessment meticulously delineates the intricate web of threats by actor or perpetrator, commencing with non-state actors and culminating in the analysis of major state actors. The National Intelligence Council stands prepared to provide policymakers with supplementary information in a classified setting. (p.4) The text is based on available open-source information through March 18, 2025, and includes foreign experts and partners to mitigate the heavily domestic politicization of international affairs, in contrast to Hong Kong or Chinese national security texts that are often heavily filled with slogans and non-analytical content. This means that the respected U.S. intelligence community is honest and sincere in providing the enhanced intelligence report, which inevitably discloses its collective opinions.

It is imperative to address several salient points in this regard: Firstly, the 2025 Annual Threat Assessment (ATA) has been meticulously crafted, offering lucid insights from the IC on targeted state and non-state actors who pose threats to the United States and its citizens on the global stage. The enhanced readability of the ATA can be attributed to its reduced politicization and bias when evaluating the capabilities and achievements of adversaries. This approach enables Americans to circumvent miscalculations stemming from political agendas and biases, fostering a more objective perspective. The 2025 ATA's enhanced readability can be attributed to the contributions of a diverse array of writers and the inauguration of a new administration under President Trump. This is distinct from the practice of HKSARG outsourcing the production of costly, time-consuming policy papers to external consultants with partisan ties.

Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea—both as individual entities and collectively—are challenging U.S. interests on the global stage by engaging in aggressive actions against other nations in their respective regions. These actions, which are characterized by both asymmetric and conventional forms of hard power, are aimed at promoting alternative systems that compete with those of the United States, particularly in the domains of trade, finance, and security. These nations seek to challenge the United States and other countries through deliberate campaigns aimed at gaining an advantage, while also attempting to avoid direct confrontation. The increasing collaboration among these adversaries is a key factor in their growing resilience against the United States, as well as the potential for hostilities with any one of them to draw in another, and pressure on other global actors to choose sides. (p.4)

The most insightful section of the document addresses non-state transnational criminals and terrorists, including foreign illicit drug actors, transnational Islamic extremists, and other transnational criminals. These actors, in essence, function as state actors in disguise, engaging in shared business activities and atrocities. It is crucial for readers to recognize the interconnected nature of these entities and to understand them as a unified entity. It is evident that without the support of states, these non-state actors would be unable to pose such a significant threat to a superpower like the United States. In essence, news reports, by their very nature, are segmented and thus cannot provide a comprehensive view of the networks depicted in this document. However, readers can discern clear ties between these global non-state actors, highlighting the limitations of fragmented news reports in providing a complete picture. This IC report, in contrast, offers a comprehensive overview, which is particularly important given the prevailing perception of segmentation in this subject area.

Al-Qa'ida continues to express its intention to target the United States and its citizens through its global network of affiliates. Leaders of the organization, some of whom remain in Iran, have sought to capitalize on anti-Israeli sentiment surrounding the war in Gaza to foster unity among Muslims and incite attacks against Israel and the United States. Al-Qa'ida's media apparatus disseminated statements from leaders and affiliates in support of Hamas, encouraging attacks against Israeli and U.S. targets. (p.6)

The strategic overview on China prepared by the relevant parties excludes Hong Kong and Macau. For this reason, the HKSARG has not yet reacted to this report at the superficial level. It is necessary to determine whether this is in the best interests of the domestic actors in Hong Kong. Was the request made by the US consulate general? Was it a secret plea from HKSARG officials or Morgan Stanley's suggestion to avoid utmost frictions? The answer to this question involves the DOGE initiative. The DOGE (Department of Government Efficiency) initiative has the potential to normalize relations between global social engineers and the US. Local capitalists have exploited Americans to advance their political agendas, such as color revolutions, while leveraging the US as a source of financial resources and a scapegoat. The demand for conspiracy theories is not aligned with the interests of the people. Without US support, local capitalists should fully fund their political activities as their primary responsibility. This would contribute to the normalization process, which would benefit both the US and the global community. In a matter of months, the administration has taken several actions that appear to be in opposition to the free flow of information. These actions include the following: the administration has shut out the Associated Press from covering White House events; it has stripped media outlets including NPR and POLITICO of their traditional work spaces in the Pentagon; it has shuttered the government-funded Voice of America; and it has reopened investigations into television networks over multiple alleged offenses, many having to do with the promotion of "diversity, equity and inclusion."

In Hong Kong, the American Democratic Party wields considerable influence, officially funding the "opposition" through the National Democratic Institute (NDI). In contrast to the Republican Party's involvement in Hong Kong, VOA and RFA function as instruments of the Democrats. Consequently, the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) is dismantling the power base and global networks of the Democrats' influence in the context of party politics. This strategic maneuver is not only a rational response to the substantial financial burden and deficits of the United States but also a calculated effort to reshape global American influence in a manner that aligns with national interests. Historically, Hong Kong capitalists and their affiliated state and substate actors have been beneficiaries of substantial funding from the Democrats, while concurrently disseminating anti-American conspiracy theories to deflect responsibility for their actions back onto the United States. However, the DOGE reform, aimed at curbing woke, leftist social engineering spending, has compelled local Hong Kong capitalists to fund their political activities independently. The implications of this shift, whether positive or negative, are twofold: it signifies the normalization of both US and Hong Kong politics, and it highlights the lack of awareness among local Hong Kong actors regarding the DOGE initiative on USAID, suggesting that influence operations outside the US Homeland will not be completely abandoned. Consequently, USAID will not be terminated; rather, it will undergo a rebranding process. The Trump administration has announced its intention to rename USAID, replacing it with the United States International Humanitarian Agency (IHA). This rebranding initiative also involves the integration of USAID into the State Department. In addition, the administration plans to implement blockchain technology into the procurement process. This implementation is intended to enhance security and transparency in the distribution of funds.

It is important to note that these developments are not isolated incidents; the Voice of America is not the only media outlet that has been targeted by these actions. President Donald Trump has signed an executive order dissolving the United States Agency for Global Media, which provides funding for Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), and Radio Free Asia (RFA). It is imperative to examine the role and the nature of these media outlets funded by the US government.

Accusations have been made against these outlets, asserting their systematic dissemination of narratives that align with the interests of the Democratic Party of the United States, both among international and domestic audiences. Russia RFE/RL disseminated unsubstantiated allegations asserting that Moscow had poisoned dissidents with "exotic toxins," including polonium and Novichok, citing Viktor Yushchenko, the Skripals, and Alexei Navalny as victims without providing substantiating evidence. VOA and RFE/RL perpetuated Ukraine's unfounded claims that Russian troops perpetrated a massacre in Bucha in April 2022, despite the complete withdrawal of all Russian forces from the area by March 30. Eastern and Central EuropeVOA and RFE/RL have also been accused of providing highly favorable coverage of regime change efforts, including the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the violent 2014 Euromaidan coup. RFE/RL has frequently targeted the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán. On March 15, RFE/RL reported on protests against the Hungarian government, yet it omitted the fact that thousands of its supporters had rallied on the national holiday.

VOA actively promoted allegations that Trump "colluded" with Russia, which were later debunked by Special Counsel Robert Mueller in 2019. AsiaRFA's coverage prioritizes China's alleged "threat" to Taiwan and promotes the militarization of the island. RFA portrays China as a significant regional threat, accuses it of "cultural genocide" in Tibet, and stokes fears about North Korea's nuclear capabilities vis-à-vis the U.S. It is important to note that RFA is not the sole voice of the United States in this regard. The following investigation will explore the Cold War origins and CIA covert operations via VOA, RFE/RL, and RFA. An analysis of media reliance on the US foreign policy establishment, predominantly guided by Democrats, will also be conducted. The Voice of America (VOA) was established during World War II in 1942 and was subsequently utilized as a Cold War propaganda instrument against the USSR.

A July 1950 CIA document revealed that the agency supported VOA in overcoming "Soviet jamming," and another CIA document from 1953 discussed similar efforts in Czechoslovakia. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) was launched in 1950 as part of psychological operations. The CIA provided covert funding for RFE/RL until 1971, and historians have documented the network's employment of former Nazi collaborators from the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. In 1977, The New York Times and Rolling Stone exposed the CIA's "worldwide propaganda network," which included at least 400 US journalists working for the agency. RFE/RL was specifically named as part of that network.

While the establishment of Radio Free Asia (RFA) is often attributed to Bill Clinton in 1994, CIA documents indicate that the organization had been targeting China and other Asian nations since the 1950s. RFA initiated broadcasting to mainland China in 1951 from the Philippines, Japan, and Pakistan, operating under the CIA's control until 1955. The cessation of RFA's broadcasts in the mid-1950s was attributed to the limited ownership of home radios in China. Subsequently, the Radio of Free Asia (ROFA) was established as a collaborative initiative between the US and South Korean intelligence services. For decades, the US-funded media functioned as extensions of Washington's intelligence agencies, running psychological operations even after the Cold War ended.

The report makes no mention of SARs.

The United States' reluctance to fully acknowledge Hong Kong and Macau as equal partners in international politics has also contributed to their reduced influence. The United States and the United Kingdom perceive these regions as a means of counteracting the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the semi-autonomous cities, akin to how Gagauzia serves as a strategic bulwark for Russia in its own context. Consequently, the United States, the United Kingdom, and other Western nations find themselves in a passive and unofficial position as backers of the HKSARG. Gagauzia, also known as Gagauzia-Yeri, is an autonomous territorial unit of Moldova.

PLA

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) possesses the capacity to execute long-range precision strikes with conventional armaments against the periphery of the Homeland in the Western Pacific, encompassing Guam, Hawaii, and Alaska. China has developed a diverse array of ballistic and cruise missiles equipped with conventional payloads, capable of being delivered from its mainland as well as via air and sea routes, including by means of nuclear-powered submarines. It is further speculated that China may be exploring the development of conventionally armed intercontinental-range missile systems, which, if developed and fielded, would allow China to threaten conventional strikes against targets in the continental United States. The PLA will continue to pursue the establishment of overseas military installations and access agreements to project power and protect China's interests abroad. To that end, Beijing may explore a range of military logistics models, including preferential access to commercial infrastructure abroad, the establishment of exclusive PLA logistics facilities with pre-positioned supplies in close proximity to commercial infrastructure, and the establishment of bases with stationed forces, in order to meet its overseas military logistics needs. China is employing complex, whole-of-government campaigns featuring coercive military, economic, and influence operations, short of war, to assert its positions and strength against others, reserving more destructive tools for full-scale conflict. It is plausible that China will expand these campaigns to advance unification with Taiwan, project power in East Asia, and reverse perceived U.S. hegemony. (p. 10)

First, it is evident that base imperialism is a norm for both the U.S. and China. Consequently, anti-base movements in Japan have no market in the international political stage today. The question arises as to the relevance of this point. This report disregards any assessment of public support and popular base while evaluating the substantial PLA capabilities and strength. Absent popular support, a robust military force cannot engage in conflict. While the surge in cyberattacks from China against the U.S. may be perceived as a pre-emptive war on either Taiwan or the homeland, the most pressing unanswered question is whether the Chinese populace support and tolerate war. In Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government and local media have colluded to conceal the substantial imports of so-called family offices, failing to provide adequate explanation to the public and the economically disadvantaged. The ruling class in Hong Kong is perpetuating the hegemony of real estate and stock speculators by facilitating the influx of international entities. This is in direct opposition to the political reform aimed at alleviating the economic burden on Hong Kong citizens. The concept of a family office entails a specific role, often characterized by requests such as "I want you to buy me a private jet" or "I want to entrust you with the management and operation of assets exceeding several tens of billions of HKD." Private bankers, a select group of professionals employed from financial conglomerates, specialize in addressing the sophisticated financial needs of the ultra-wealthy. Their responsibilities encompass a wide range of services, including tax planning, estate management, asset allocation, and facilitating special purchases and recreational activities such as tennis matches. This professional service, however, comes at a significant cost. The extensive volatility resulting from these services can have a detrimental effect on the economically disadvantaged population of Hong Kong. This, in turn, can lead to a decline in public support for the government, particularly in times of political and military conflict, as discussed in the text. The United States, in this regard, holds a distinct advantage.

The Sino-Philippine conflict of 2024 is thoroughly delineated in the 2025 Annual Threat Assessment (ATA). In 2024, the People's Republic of China (PRC) employed tactical maneuvers in the South China Sea, resulting in the Philippines' loss of unilateral access to certain contested regions. This prompted diplomatic negotiations between Beijing and Manila, wherein the Philippines acquiesced to certain concessions in exchange for access. However, the likelihood of Manila acquiescing to these concessions is minimal, thereby creating the potential for either side to escalate the conflict. (p. 11) Hong Kong media outlets demonstrated a lack of clarity in their reporting on the incident, primarily due to their inability to comprehend the intricacies of the situation. This deficiency is further compounded by the limited analytical capacity of the "journalists," who are primarily adept in articulating tribal narratives, rather than offering a nuanced understanding of the geopolitical implications. The Intelligence Community (IC) has discerned the critical interests involved in this matter. This stark contrast warrants attention.

The rationale behind the United States' claim to Greenland is articulated in the 2025 Annual Threat Assessment (ATA). China's objectives in global shipping and resource access, including in the Arctic, where the melting of sea ice is engendering opportunities for augmented maritime transport and energy exploitation, particularly along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) off the Russian coast, are analogous. China seeks access to the region's potentially abundant natural resources, including oil, gas, and minerals, despite not being among the eight Arctic countries that control territory in the region. Beijing aims to establish more direct and efficient maritime shipping routes to Russia and other Northern Hemisphere regions. This is intended to fuel China's economic growth and energy security, while reducing its dependence on energy from the Middle East. China has gradually increased engagement with Greenland, primarily through mining projects, infrastructure development, and scientific research initiatives. Despite the present lack of active engagement, China's long-term strategic objective is to expand access to Greenland's natural resources and leverage this access as a strategic foothold to advance its economic interests in the Arctic region. (p. 12)

It is noteworthy that both the Panama and Greenland claims made by the Trump administration are driven by concerns regarding China's perceived threats and the global competition for resources, as well as military logistical considerations. This rational is also absent in the explanations offered by the Hong Kong "professional" media of all kinds until the present.

References:

a. 2025 ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY