Open-source intelligence (OSINT)
國家安全？ 一個國家真正有主權，人民不餓，有住屋，健康，自由，而且受教育時才算安全的。
National security? If one country has genuine sovereignty, people aren't starved, own their houses, being healthy, free, and educated, then it'll be safe. - General Carlos Prats González quoted from Exorcising Terror: The Incredible Unending Trial of General Augusto Pinochet (Ariel Dorfman, JP ver., 2006, p.165)
IMPORTANT 2021 Hong Kong Electoral Reform
2021 Hong Kong electoral reform only intensified oligarchy. It won't improve the Hong Kong workers' livelihood in any way.
UPDATE:
The failure of the individual proposal ''Increasing Land Supply on All Fronts'' (this proposal was NON-binding resolution thus it's a kind of PR stuff. However, that's also a litmus test for the political tendency of the newly reformed Legislative Council of Hong Kong. Vacant land tax is one of important solutions to the issue) proved correctness of this analysis. Intensification of oligarchy by the electoral reform will only let oligarchs more easily disapprove any attempt for improving livelihoods of Hong Kong workers. At the same time, citizens shouldn't ignore the hypocritical nature of 'pro-establishment' Jeffrey Lam Kin-fung who submitted the PR proposal (林健鋒議員的 “重建社會信心”議案). The failure also indicated that the remnant of the 'opposition' camp, Cheng Chung-tai - one of prominent intruders of Legislative Council on July 1, 2019 - stands with oligarchs.
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Apparently, both HKNSL and 2021 Hong Kong electoral reform are political responses of CPC (Communist Party of China; a.k.a. Chinese Communist Party; CCP) to the slogan of ''The Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement'' Five demands, not one less. Unfortunately, it just literally exacerbated pre-existed structural issues of legislative council that had actually produced violent tendencies and reactions of the ''opposition'' camp after 1997. As a result, dictatorship of bureaucrats and oligarchs against non-listed capitalists and the entire working class people has been further intensified by the ''reform'' of 2021 by reducing 35 directly elected seats to 20 (20 out of total 90 seats) for empowerment of undemocratically elected seats of both ''pro-establishment'' functional constituencies and Election Committee. The secret of Hong Kong politics is that vast majority of voters (total about 60%) support the opposition camp while minority ''pro-establishment'' camp (always average 40%) can systematically secure the majority of legislative council with ''nominated'' lawmakers from listed companies and designated business interest groups of functional constituencies. The electoral, legislative or governing system was and still is kleptocratic dictatorship not any kind of democratic system at all even by the capitalist standard itself. According to the Marxist standard, it's far from socialism. Furthermore, no matter whether they are democratically elected or not, all of them are ''privileged'' business owners themselves not representatives of workers. Even though we compromisingly count 3 functional constituency seats for labor as ''representatives'' of workers, it's still only 3 against 87 corporate seats. Of course, it's not any kind of Marxism (dictatorship of proletariat) at all.
The general tendency (outlook) of Hong Kong oligarchy (politics of HK) is that they do everything possible to postpone any social changes that would threaten or undermine their vested interests. This current can be symbolically seen on HK labor laws and policies after 1997(The labour law is the best reflection of the political nature of the ruling classes). Only quantitative changes within the pre-existed framework were allowed without any structural change.
And also they are waiting for the collapse of the CPC regime while acting as part of the ''establishment'' in order to maintain their social hegemony in Hong Kong. Obviously, this is not any kind of gradualist reformism. In fact, they are just selfish reactionaries. Remember, the''pro-establishment''camp of today was also the ''pro-establishment''camp under the British colonial rule. It means that so called ''pro-establishment'' is not equal with Chinese patriotism fundamentally. Being ''pro-establishment''is just unreliable opportunism.
Unfortunately, CPC's electoral reform directly serves their political goal(unlike official PR stunts, oligarchs don't really need democracy while they themselves are automatically given designated seats with or without elections). For this, 'separatists', 'external forces', 'opposition' villains were created to stage the political crisis that allowed oligarchs to exploit the situation for political gains. As a result, true winners are Hong Kong oligarchs not CPC.
Remember, CPC is the only internal force who can really fight greedy oligarchs of Hong Kong. 在訂立《基本法》的時候，中央政府很明白如果立法會全部議席由一人一票產生，他們便不能控制誰是立法會的多數派。然而透過保留功能界別以及背後的利益交易，中央政府就可以很大程度上左右立法會的派別構成。自特區成立以來，主流民意一直要求取消功能界別制度，唯自二零零四年起地區直選和功能界別的議席比例就一直都沒有改變過，維持各佔一半，政府也未能承諾最終取消功能界別。功能界別的存在保持了建制陣營在議會的主導權，卻同時帶來一個很壞的後果：市民對立法會的期望改變。在一個正常的議會當中，選民投票選出議員時的其中一個考量，是議會的構成會如何影響議案的處理。在理性選擇的框架下，支持某項政策的選民理應投最有能力落實此政策的候選人一票，好讓他們在議會中佔多數，然後通過相關的法案。實際上的選民的考量當然會複雜很多，例如有些選民會接受他們的代表在必要時妥協，另一些的選民卻會希望他們的代表立場堅定，甚至「有破壞沒建設」，但求阻礙他們眼中的惡法通過。問題的重點，在於當選民認為他們支持的政黨或派別永遠無法成為多數的時候，選民的思考便會傾向後者多一點，對候選人能力的評估也從重視審議的能力變成破壞的能力。(1)
The ''reform'' specifically embodies CPC's view, intelligence on the political and economic situation of Hong Kong. And most importantly it's a major compromisation to oligarchs of Hong Kong. In fact, it has nothing to do with increasing political power of the working class of Hong Kong as the number of the labor seats has been kept unchanged since the previous structure. In other words, CPC revisionists betrayed workers in terms of Marxism.
Remember One Country means the socialist constitution, and both socialism of mainland China and capitalism of Hong Kong / Macau are essential composition of Two Systems. Theoretically, only acceptable capitalism for CPC is capitalism under the control of socialist constitution of China.
The only way to overcome poverty is to give power to the poor.
However it's quite understandable while labor aristocrats of Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions (a ''pro-establishment'' pseudo-trade union. The limited company itself is not registered as any kind of trade union in order to legally ''earn'' donations from capitalists; HKFTU) dominate 4 seats at the legislative counsel. And another labor aristocrat organisation The Federation of Hong Kong and Kowloon Labour Unions (''pro-establishment''; FLU) owns 1 seat. Thus adding one more labor seat would only be beneficial for labor aristocrats and no significant change for working class people.
For correctly understanding both Hong Kong politics and the election reform, there are several questions must be answered.
''Political parties'' of Hong Kong are fundamentally same with political parties of other countries?
''Lawmakers'' of Hong Kong are fundamentally same with lawmakers of other countries?
''Trade Unions'' of Hong Kong are fundamentally same with unions of other countries?
Who are true beneficiaries of both ''The Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement'' and the pandemic? (a full list required)
Is there transparency on all nominated members and appointed organisations involved in the entire election (''selection'') process? (a full list required)
Is there transparency on donators who support specific politicians, political parties and candidates? (a full list required)
Simple answers to the question 1, 2, 3 are NO; an answer to the question 4 is Hong Kong’s 50 Richest People (Forbes), and answers to question 5 and 6 are also NO. For instance, chambers of commerce don't disclose their full members online for political reasons. And those members would also be political donators.
FACTS
1.There is still no political party law in Hong Kong thus so called ''political parties'' are registered as limited companies under Cap. 622 Companies Ordinance or NGOs / clubs under Cap. 151 Societies Ordinance. In other words, there is no authentic political party in Hong Kong at all. Therefore, party politics in HK is just an illusion created by media. Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau (CMAB) denied possibility of political party law in Hong Kong in 2004. It's one of major differences from other countries.
香港的政黨仍在發展階段，我們應讓政黨有足夠的空間成長。在現階段對政黨運作施加法定管制，可能會窒礙而非促 進政黨的發展。事實上，部分立法會議員和學者也曾發表類似的意見。例如在二零零四年六月的事務委員會會議上，有委員指出立法旨在規管，而引進政黨法會對政黨的運作施加限制，並窒礙政黨的發展。
香港並無法例要求政黨註冊，也沒有專為規管政黨的運作而訂立的法例。一般來說，政黨是根據《公司條例》(第 32 章)註冊為公司，或根據《社團條例》(第 151 章)註冊為社團。
我們採取進一步措施，促進政黨發展。自二零零四年立法會選舉開始，我們推行了為候選人提供財政資助的計劃，又讓候選人在選票上印上所屬政黨的名稱和標誌。在財政資助計劃下，當選或取得不少於 5%有效選票的候選人或候選名單可獲得資助以抵銷部分選舉開支。計劃有助減輕政黨在資助黨員參選方面的財政承擔。政黨可以把省下來的資源轉而投放於其他用途，例如進行政策研究和其他活動。透過減低競選活動的財政開支，這項計劃有利於政治人才晉身政壇，這點對政黨的發展十分重要。
有意見認為引進政黨法將帶來積極意義，包括政黨可獲得法律下的認可，政黨運作和財政透明度得以提高，以及為政府資助政黨提供法律依據。雖然香港沒有政黨法，但現行措施足以涵蓋上文第 11 段所述政黨法的有關影響。根據我們的選舉法例，所有候選人均須申報他們的選舉開支和所得的捐贈。
我們也須留意海外經驗顯示政黨法會包含規管條文。一些海外的司法管轄區有專門的法例，規管政黨的登記、 財政來源和運作。這類法律旨在規管，並在不同範疇對政黨施加管制。例子包括美國、加拿大和德國的政黨須公布帳目，列明年內的撥款來源和用途。在德國、英國和新西蘭，政黨須向指定的選舉機構登記，方合資格參加某些選舉。此外，德國和新西蘭的法例對政黨派出候選人參選的選拔程序作出了規管。(2)
政黨 (political party)指 ——(a)宣稱是政黨並在香港運作的政治性團體或組織；或 (b)其主要功能或宗旨是為參加選舉的候選人宣傳或作準備的團體或組織，而候選人所參加的選舉須是選出議員或任何區議會的議員的選舉。(3)
According to Cap. 542 Legislative Council Ordinance, so called ''political party'' only means an election and propaganda device for candidates. It has nothing to do with political ideology or principles. It's just a tool for elections.
2. ''Lawmakers of Hong Kong'' have no independent rights to make law proposals on the government structure, governmental operations and the state budget thus actual ''lawmakers'' are governmental officials while the most of law proposals are government proposals not individual proposals. Furthermore, the logical contradiction is that any law proposal is inevitably about governmental operations because it's basically regulated by the government itself. The definition is quite vague.
議員 (Member) 指獲選為立法會議員的人。(由2000年第10號第47條修訂；由2003年第25號第2條修訂) (2)就本條例而言 ——(a)某人與某團體有密切聯繫的情況包括(但不限於)為該團體的成員、會員、合夥人、僱員或(如該團體是法人團體)高級人員或(如該團體不是法人團體)人員；及(b)某人與某功能界別有密切聯繫的情況包括(但不限於) ——(i)為該功能界別的團體選民的成員、會員、合夥人、僱員或(如該團體是法人團體)高級人員或(如該團體不是法人團體)人員，或為該團體選民的團體成員；或 (ii)屬於指明為該功能界別的選民的某類別人士。 (由1999年第48號第2條修訂；由2001年第21號第62條修訂) (c)(由2001年第21號第62條廢除) (4)
According to Cap. 542 Legislative Council Ordinance, the implied premise is that ''members'' should be representatives of interest groups in this society not just a pure individual with citizenship.
《基本法》第六十二條第五款訂明，香港特別行政區政府獲賦職權，擬定並提出法案、議案及附屬法規。政府提出的法案稱為政府法案。 根據《基本法》第七十四條，凡不涉及公共開支或政治體制或政府運作的法案，可由立法會議員個別或聯名提出。至於涉及政府政策的法案，議員在提出前必須得到行政長官的書面同意。立法會議員提出的法案，稱為議員法案。(5)
In 2019,
香港立法會和世界各地的議會一樣，首要功能固然是要代表民意。不過香港立法會無論是選舉方式和議事制度，都使它無法好好發揮民意代表的功能。現時香港立法會有七十個議席，當中一半由地區直選產生，另一半由功能界別產生。所謂功能界別，很大程度上和行政長官選舉中的選舉委員會相重疊。選舉委員會中有漁農界、保險界和法律界，立法會功能界別當中一樣有漁農界、保險界和法律界。不同的地方，在於每個界別選舉委員會中所佔的席數不一，但在立法會當中則一般只有一席。...... 政府提出的法案，如獲得出席會議的全體議員的過半數票，即為通過。立法會議員個人提出的議案、法案和對政府法案的修正案均須分別經功能團體選舉產生的議員和分區直接選舉、選舉委員會選舉產生的議員兩部分出席會議議員各過半數通過。......自特區成立以來，就有很多議案雖然獲得過半數議員支持，卻在「分組點票」之下被否決。特別是以保護勞工和低下階層為目標的議案，既得利益就往往可以利用工商界在功能界別的優勢，把「分組點票」變成他們的專屬否決權。(6)
In 2021,
立法會以往要通過議員提出的議案或法案，都須跨過「分組點票」的門檻，即要同時獲得功能界別過半數在席議員，以及地區直選過半數在席議員贊成才可通過。而在人大常委會修改香港選舉制度後，「分組點票」的要求仍然存在，但門檻跟以往有不同。根據基本法附件二的內容，除《基本法》另有規定外，立法會對法案和議案的表決採取下列程序：一) 政府提出的法案，如獲得出席會議的全體議員過半數票，即可通過。二) 立法會議員個人提出的議案、法案和政府法案的修正案，均須分別經選舉委員會選舉產生的議員和功能團體選舉、分區直接選舉產生的議員兩部分出席會議議員各過半數通過。同樣根據附件二，未來立法會由選舉委員會選舉產生的議員為40人，此40人屬一個分組；而功能團體議員和分區直選議員，則分別有30及20人，此50人屬同一分組。未來由議員提出的議案、法案和對政府法案提出的修正案若要過通，就需要獲上述兩個分組，各自出席會議議員的過半數，才會獲得通過。(7)
In the 2016 composition, there are total 70 seats of legislative council (30 ''geographical constituencies'' seats directly elected by citizens; 5 seats nominated from directly elected district councils; 30 seats for nominated functional constituencies). The ''pro-establishment'' camp can't win democratic elections solely for the 30 seats, and they even lost the 2019 district council election, the 5 seats will be dominated by opposition thus they requested CPC to simply eliminate the 5 seats which could be allocated for district council members in order to outflank their competitors. On the other hand, the secret of the less popular ''pro-establishment'' camp to maintain majority in legislative council is its dominance on the functional constituencies (25 seats out of 30 seats within 28 categories). We don't think about infighting among opposition camps and their own split that caused another difficulties on the legislative elections(it's still strategically improvable even though they can't change the system itself).
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A member proposal must be green-lighted separately by more than half of democratically elected members and functional constituencies. Separate voting requited for individual law proposals.
In the 2021 composition, the right of members has been further undermined by the ''reform'' because both 20 democratically elected seats and 30 nominated functional constituencies combined into 50 seats. And additional 40 newly nominated seats of election committee constituency form another unit for approval of any individual proposal. As a result, an individual proposal of ''lawmakers'' must gain over the half of 50 seats (one unit) and 40 seats (another unit) each. A-priori, 30 functional constituencies dominate the absolute majority against democratically elected members within one unit. Simply, it undermined rights of members, the democratic elements and effects of the election in order to secure election victories of unpopular ''pro-establishment'' camp. In other words, ''lawmakers'' of Hong Kong are mainly bureaucrats themselves (only a few individual proposals can be seen) because the rights of individual proposals of members have been further nullified by the ''reform'' in practice. This is so called ''executive-driven'' government system of Hong Kong. Separation of powers is permanently in crisis.
In this legislative structure, crony capitalist negotiations between capitalist functional constituencies and bureaucrats become decisive factors to approve law proposals in Hong Kong. It's total denial of any democratic process from the beginning. The 'reform' just only intensified this malpractice. In other words, CPC gave more power to greedy local capitalists who are major causes of the social issues of this city. Con artists won the game. 3. Trade unions include labour unions, employers' unions and hybrid ones. Moreover, associations of trade unions (trade union federations) are also registered under Cap. 332 Trade Unions Ordinance. The term ''trade union'' doesn't only mean a ''labor union''.
Trade union (職工會) means any combination the principal objects of which are under its constitution the regulating of relations between employees and employers, or between employees and employees, or between employers and employers, whether such combination would or would not, if this Ordinance had not been enacted, have been deemed to have been an unlawful combination by reason of some one or more of its purposes being in restraint of trade; (Amended 15 of 1971 s. 3) Trade union federation (職工會聯會) means a trade union which is wholly an association or combination of other registered trade unions. (8)
Like ''political parties'' and ''lawmakers'' of Hong Kong, trade unions, especially ''labor unions'' are not authentic because they don't have the essential right to be functional labor unions. That is the right of collective bargaining. Not only Hong Kong workers but also Mainland Chinese workers and Macau workers don't have basic three rights due to fatal lack of the right of collective bargaining. A labor union must have the basic three rights otherwise it can't function as a genuine labor union under capitalism. Thus, there is no labor union in Hong Kong at all in practice.
Collective bargaining is the process in which working people, through their unions, negotiate contracts with their employers to determine their terms of employment, including pay, benefits, hours, leave, job health and safety policies, ways to balance work and family, and more. Collective bargaining is a way to solve workplace problems. It is also the best means for raising wages in America. Indeed, through collective bargaining, working people in unions have higher wages, better benefits and safer workplaces. In the United States, some three-quarters of private-sector workers and two-thirds of public employees have the right to collective bargaining. This right came to U.S. workers through a series of laws. The Railway Labor Act granted collective bargaining to railroad workers in 1926 and now covers many transportation workers, such as those in airlines. In 1935, the National Labor Relations Act clarified the bargaining rights of most other private-sector workers and established collective bargaining as the “policy of the United States.” The right to collective bargaining also is recognized by international human rights conventions. The freedom to form and join a union is core to the U.N. Universal Declaration on Human Rights and is an “enabling” right—a fundamental right that ensures the ability to protect other rights. (9)
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The legal protection of workers in a place is generally assessed by its substantial implementation of three basic rights of workers, “the right to organize trade union” or “right to organizing”, “right to collective bargaining” or “right to bargain collectively” and “right to strike” or “right to collective action”. ......the Hong Kong Government tries to create a picture with a high harmony of labour relations, but it keeps its eyes closed to severe disadvantages of workers in the seriously unequal power relations in the areas of labour relations, politics and economics. ......Few days before the handover (June 26, 1997), the private member’s bill of Lee Cheuk Yan of the CTU, Employee’s Rights to Representation, Consultation and Collective Bargaining Bill, was passed, but it was repealed by the Provisional Legislative Council three months later in the reason of that the provision caused “obstructions to the administration of the SAR Government”. The ordinance was repealed on October 29, 1997. CTU complained the issue to the ILO. The committee of freedom of association of the ILO made recommendations that the Hong Kong Government should make provisions to encourage and further the role of trade union, employer and concerned societies in facilitating free and voluntary collective bargaining. In Hong Kong, there is no law to demand that enterprises must recognize the role of trade union and proceed collective bargaining with trade union. The Labour Department emphasizes that collective bargaining is “voluntary” only. It follows the international labour conventions. But the experts of the ILO argued that voluntary bargaining refers to the fact that any persons who take part in the negotiation are from free coerce to conclude agreements. (10)
In short, the working class people (workers) of Hong Kong are 'managed'' by four major labor political parties (not authentic political parties due to lack of the political party law) who disguise themselves as trade unions while they themselves are de facto limited companies which are neither trade unions nor trade union federations under Cap. 332 Trade Unions Ordinance. Such as Hong Kong Confederation of Trade Unions (職工盟; CTU), The Hong Kong Federations of Trade Unions (工聯會; FTU), The Federation of Hong Kong and Kowloon Labour Unions (勞聯; FLU) and Hong Kong and Kowloon Trades Union Council (工團總會; TUC). It's total deception. Thus Hong Kong workers are systematically deceived by con artists(labor aristocrats). We should prove this theory by proofs. The officially recognised 'federations of trade unions' are neither trade unions nor federations of trade unions but they themselves are ''political parties'' (limited companies; NGOs) under Cap. 151 Societies Ordinance. Moreover, because they registered themselves under Cap. 151 Societies Ordinance for earning donations, they can't enjoy rights of Cap. 332 Trade Unions Ordinance.
職 工 會 必 須 根 據 《 職 工 會 條 例 》 登 記 ， 該 條 例 由 職 工 會 登 記 局 局 長 執 行 。 一 經 登 記 ， 職 工 會 便 成 為 法 人 團 體 ， 享 有 若 干 民 事 訴 訟 的 豁 免 權 。年 內 ， 新 登 記 的 工 會 和 職 工 會 聯 會 分 別 有 20 個 和 一 個 。 年 底 時 ， 根 據 《 職 工 會 條 例 》 登 記 的 工 會 共 有 654 個 (其 中 僱 員 工 會 佔 610 個 、 僱 主 組 織 25 個 、 由 勞 資 雙 方 聯 合 組 成 的 團 體 佔 19 個) ， 而 職 工 會 聯 會 則 有 三 個 。約 半 數 的 僱 員 工 會 分 別 附 屬 於 以 下 四 個 根 據 《 社 團 條 例 》 註 冊 的 主 要 勞 工 組 織 ︰ 香 港 工 會 聯 合 會 (有 屬 會 143 個) 、 港 九 工 團 聯 合 總 會 (有 屬 會 52 個) 、 香 港 職 工 會 聯 盟 (有 屬 會 52 個) 和 港 九 勞 工 社 團 聯 會 (有 屬 會 48 個) 。(11)
本條例《 社 團 條 例 》不適用的人 (3)根據《職工會條例》(第332章)登記的職工會或職工會聯會。 (由1964年第59號法律公告代替) (12)
We should do fact-check by ourselves. Check the HKPLIC's List of Societies(total 37,852; May 2021).
As we can see here, Hong Kong's so called 'labor unions' aren't authentic labor unions due to lack of the right of collective bargaining. Meanwhile, Hong Kong's big 4 'federations of labor unions' are also neither labor unions nor federations of trade unions but they themselves are limited companies, NGOs under Cap. 151 Societies Ordinance. Their aim is to earn donations and win legislative seats for labor aristocrats. In short, Hong Kong has no labor unions.
自稱為工會，假裝職工會聯會的四大勞動政黨都是社團，而不是工會或職工會或職工會聯會。勞動者階級必須清楚地知道該4大勞動組織都不是任何職工會！4. The true beneficiaries of the anti-extradition law amendment bill movement during 2019-2021 were revealed by Forbes. Hong Kong’s 50 Richest People is the best list.
#1 Li Ka-shing ($35.4 B) CK Hutchison Holdings. The biggest oligarch (monopoly capitalist) of Hong Kong who supported black-shirts and criticised by CPC in September 2019. One of major figures of so called ''real-estate hegemony''.
READ MORE:
#2 Lee Shau Kee ($30.5 B) Henderson Land Development. Black-shirts declared establishment of the Hong Kong provisional government at one of his shopping malls MOSTown late at night on October 4, 2019. Then, they published HONG KONG PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT MANIFESTO on October 5, 2019. One of major figures of so called ''real-estate hegemony''.
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#3 Henry Cheng ($22.1 B) New World Development. One of major figures of so called ''real-estate hegemony''. Among other oligarchs, he is more prominently acting as a ''pro-establishment'' figure due to his membership as a vice chairman of one of ''pro-establishment'' ruling class interest groups Our Hong Kong Foundation.
#4 Yeung Kin-man & Lam Wai-ying ($18.6 B) Biel Crystal Manufactory.
#5 Lui Che Woo ($17.8 B) K. Wah International Holdings.
#6 Lee Man Tat ($17.4 B) LKK Group.
#7 Peter Woo ($17 B) Beyond property, Wheelock and Wharf control important telecom, port and retailing assets, including luxury department store chain Lane Crawford. (13) One of major figures of so called ''real-estate hegemony''.
During anti-extradition bill amendment bill riots, at one of properties of The Wharf (Holdings) Limited, Harbour City, some corporate staff blocked police op and let protesters keep harassing tenants as reported by TVB on December 21, 2019.
在下一層，有增援的便衣警察和聚集的人推撞。海港城的保安到場，跟警察對話。 海港城保安表示..「你們能否先散開?」 警察回應..「這不能解決問題，你能否保證他們不搗亂?你也要和商戶交代。」 之後人群繼續在商店貼標語。(14)
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#8 Joseph Lau ($13.5 B) Chinese Estates.
#9 Kwong Siu-hing ($13.4 B) Sun Hung Kai Properties. One of major figures of so called ''real-estate hegemony''.
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#10 Joseph Tsai ($12.5 B) Alibaba Group.
#11 Michael Kadoorie ($7 B) CLP Holdings now serves 80% of Hong Kong's population. (15) One of the best examples of Hong Kong oligarchs and its monopoly capitalism.
READ MORE:
Book Review : Land And The Ruling Class In Hong Kong 地產霸權 (Alice Poon Wai-han 潘慧嫻, 2005) 壟斷資本和國家安全問題
The most important facts are below:
a. Among Hong Kong’s 50 Richest People, at least 30 out of the 50 richest capitalists are running real estate-related business. Many of them are developers. In other words, the most powerful layer of the Hong Kong ruling classes is composed of developers.
Li Ka-shing; Lee Shau Kee; Henry Cheng; Lui Che Woo; Peter Woo; Joseph Lau; Kwong Siu-hing; Michael Kadoorie; Francis Choi; Law Kar Po; Geoffrey & Jonathan Kwok; Raymond, Edward & Christopher Kwok; Tang Shing-bor; Thomas & Adam Kwok; Edwin Leong; Pansy Ho; Samuel Tak Lee; Angela Leong; Rita Tong Liu; Or Wai Sheun; Li Sze Lim; Fong Yun Wah; Lawrence Ho; Chan Tan Ching-fen; Gordon Wu; Pan Sutong; Vincent Lo; Goodwin Gaw; Vivien Chen; Pollyanna Chu.
READ MORE:
Hong Kong’s 50 Richest People
b. Surprisingly, their running companies are NOT in the target list of the anti-extradition law amendment bill movement. Thus they were unharmed by colour revolutionary rioters. In short, not only this is a question but also it's an answer itself to the political situation. Unlike media exaggeration, only 13 relatively small business groups and about 267 companies were directly attacked by rioters.The major economic impact was due to suspension of mainland tourist business to Hong Kong. And the unemployment rate was 2.9% in 2018 and 3.4% in 2019. Thus there was no real economic crisis in HK. Furthermore, repair and restoration of some public facilities - it's worth 150 million HKD - became another business opportunities for oligarchs.
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Hong Kong Intelligence Report #18 Conclusion of the Class Analysis on The 2019 Hong Kong protests 5. Who are actual political ruling classes of Hong Kong? Unlike outsiders wrongly think, not all capitalists are involved in the election process of Hong Kong. In fact, so called ''ruling classes'' who practically run the political establishment of the city are mentioned in the Cap. 542 Legislative Council Ordinance. In other words, other capitalists are literally excluded by the establishment a-priori. For instance, ''undemocratically elected'' establishment of 28 functional constituencies. They are dominant roles in the entire establishment as members of Election Committee (1,500 members; they undemocratically ''select'' chief executive and 40 seats of legislative council as crossmembers; they themselves are not democratically elected by all effective voters of Hong Kong), lawmakers (30 seats out of 90 seats) and advisory members of numerous governmental organisations. Among them, only 3 out of 90 seats are labor representatives at legislative council. The vast majorities of members are all corporate representatives.
香港立法會和世界各地的議會一樣，首要功能固然是要代表民意。不過香港立法會無論是選舉方式和議事制度，都使它無法好好發揮民意代表的功能。現時香港立法會有七十個議席，當中一半由地區直選產生，另一半由功能界別產生。所謂功能界別，很大程度上和行政長官選舉中的選舉委員會相重疊。選舉委員會中有漁農界、保險界和法律界，立法會功能界別當中一樣有漁農界、保險界和法律界。不同的地方，在於每個界別選舉委員會中所佔的席數不一，但在立法會當中則一般只有一席。功能界別的出現正正是立法會不能「好好議事」的一個重要原因，因為它大幅扭曲了立法會的代表性。前文談及所有選舉委員會的制度問題，在立法會功能界別當中同樣適用：一）界別的成立沒有客觀標準；二）界別選民地位的定義沒有客觀標準；三）每個界別的代表人數差距極大；和四）大多數市民無權參與。舉個例，商界（第一）的選民只限香港總商會會員，商界（第二）的選民則只限香港中華總商會會員，其他的商人和組織都被排除在外。因為這些限制，在二零一六年的立法會選舉中，就有十二名候選人循功能界別自動當選。[所謂最資深立法會議員，地產界代表石禮謙就是自2000年擔任議員以來自動當選的絕佳例子] 回顧自特區成立以來的五屆立法會選舉，有三個界別（鄉議局、進出口界及商界（二））從來都是自動當選，一次正式競爭都沒有。自動當選的出現，代表他們的界別在選舉前已各自被不同的政治力量所壟斷，其他勢力明白就算參選也枉廢心思。換言之，功能界別的設立可確保個別政治勢力能在立法會當中穩奪席位，違反民主原則。(16)
Cap. 542 Legislative Council Ordinance article 20 to 20ZA listed ruling companies, trade unions and interest parties as 'representatives' of specified industry or community. Within the system, they personally dominate each industry or community as rulers.
For instance,
20F. Composition of the legal functional constituency
The legal functional constituency is composed of—
(a) members of The Law Society of Hong Kong entitled to vote at general meetings of the Society; and
(b) members of the Hong Kong Bar Association entitled to vote at general meetings of the Association; and
(c) legal officers within the meaning of the Legal Officers Ordinance (Cap. 87); and
(d) persons appointed under section 3 of the Legal Aid Ordinance (Cap. 91); and
(e) persons deemed to be legal officers for the purpose of the Legal Officers Ordinance (Cap. 87) by section 75(3)of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (Cap. 6) or section 3(3) of the Director of Intellectual Property (Establishment) Ordinance (Cap. 412); and
(f) the Legal Adviser of the Legislative Council Secretariat and his or her assistants who are in the full-time employment of The Legislative Council Commission and are barristers or solicitors as defined in the Legal Practitioners Ordinance (Cap. 159).
(Added 48 of 1999 s. 13)
20N.
Composition of the real estate and construction functional constituency
The real estate and construction functional constituency is composed of—
(a) members of The Real Estate Developers Association of Hong Kong entitled to vote at general meetings of the Association; and
(b) members of The Hong Kong Construction Association, Limited entitled to vote at general meetings of the Association; and
(c) members of The Hong Kong E&M Contractors’ Association Limited entitled to vote at general meetings of the Association.
(Added 48 of 1999 s. 13)
20P. Composition of the commercial (first) functional constituency The commercial (first) functional constituency is composed of bodies that are members of The Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce entitled to vote at general meetings of the Chamber. (Added 48 of 1999 s. 13)
20Q. Composition of the commercial (second) functional constituency The commercial (second) functional constituency is composed of members of The Chinese General Chamber of Commerce entitled to vote at general meetings of the Chamber. (Added 48 of 1999 s. 13)
20R. Composition of the industrial (first) functional constituency The industrial (first) functional constituency is composed of members of the Federation of Hong Kong Industries entitled to vote at general meetings of the Federation. (Added 48 of 1999 s. 13)
20S. Composition of the industrial (second) functional constituency The industrial (second) functional constituency is composed of bodies that are members of The Chinese Manufacturers’ Association of Hong Kong entitled to vote at general meetings of the Association. (Added 48 of 1999 s. 13) (17)
Apparently, those 'pro-universal suffrage' provocateurs didn't even read the ordinance by themselves while some hypocritical employers' trade union, the most powerful one The Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce has a secure seat within the establishment without democratic elections. The more interesting thing is that US companies like Dow Jones & Company (Wall Street Journal) and The New York Times (HKN0347) are also members of the 'pro-establishment' ('pro-Beijing') trade union. In other words, 'pro-democracy', 'anti-CCP' social justice warriors are also enjoying the electoral privilege as members of the 'pro-establishment' camp simultaneously. Furthermore, some 'leftist' media like Wen Wei Pao still supports oligarchs, and has historical connections with US imperialism (represented by Dow Jones). This is the answer to recent political events of Hong Kong. See appendix. The governing structure of ruling classes itself tells everything about the nature of political events in Hong Kong. READ MORE:
6. All political donators of each ''political party'' of Hong Kong should be published in order to let voters know their true political nature and ''masterminds'' of political shows. In fact, both ''pro-establishment'' and opposition camps are basically funded by same tycoons including multinational companies in order to protect their business interests. It's hypocritical to denounce ''external forces'' while receiving donations from multinational corporations however it's in common with US and any other capitalist countries.
For instance,
新選舉制度下，民建聯身為建制派第一大黨的地位會否受挑戰是未知之數，民建聯吸金依然拋離其他政黨。《立場》翻查，民建聯最新一份向公司註冊處提交的財務報表，發現民建聯在2020年3月截全年，年度收入和支出同創新高，收入錄得近 1.5 億，其中逾九成是會員捐款，報表中再無細項詳述會員捐款收入來源。支出創新高，但該財政年度舉行區議會選舉，民建聯照樣大敗。民建聯主席李慧琼回覆《立場》查詢時指，感謝一眾愛國愛港友好、支持者在民建聯艱難時期繼續支持民建聯，包括捐款。她不透露會員捐款的來源，表示一如既往尊重捐款人的意願，不會公開名單。香港現並無政黨法，沒有規定政黨公布捐款人的身份，公眾無從得知會員捐款的來源。(18)
【本報訊】(記者：馬嶽明 余秉峰) 全港最大規模工會、以代表基層工人自居的工聯會，成立70年來一直未有公開任何財務資料，港人只知這個左派工會不愁使費，卻對其財政狀況毫無頭緒。本報近日取得工聯會最新財務報告，終揭開其財政「全相」。這個擁有42萬會員的工會，過去3年收入達3.8億，包括2.42億「捐款」，可謂財雄勢大。記者發現，工聯會將2,470萬元轉撥至關聯的工聯物業管理有限公司，「作抵銷本屆結存盈餘，因此本屆三年期無需向稅務局繳納利得稅」。3名會計師閱畢報表後，均認為此乃工聯會的避稅招數。經會計師推算，避稅款項估計最多392萬元。本報取得這份第36屆財務報告，報告披露由2015年1月1日至2017年12月31日的3年間，工聯會的會務經常費收支及資產負債情況。值得注意的是，工聯會過去3年收入約3.8億元，較上屆增加15%。最大收入來源是捐款收入，逾2.42億元，佔總收入63.74%，但文件未有列出「水喉」來源。工聯會的最大開支是僱員薪津，3年支出約2.28億元，即每年約7,600萬，媲美部份上市公司。文件顯示工聯會上屆盈餘約2,380萬元。工聯會的總資產約2.5億元，總負債相對而言十分低，僅598萬元，但其資產構成項目耐人尋味，98%由「工聯物業管理公司往來」這個項目組成，涉資約2.46億元。一名不願具名的會計師表示，從會計角度，歸於資產項目下的往來賬目，一般被視為借予第三方的款項或應收賬。工聯會現金只有1.3萬元，銀行存款也僅約199萬。這家工聯物業管理公司的「重要性」，在文件中某一頁字句中露了端倪。該段指出：「工聯會期內向『工聯物業管理有限公司』的往來帳項轉撥2,470萬元，以此抵銷本屆結存盈餘，故此期內無需向稅務局繳納利得稅款。」......工聯會是註冊工會組織，會長是吳秋北。由於工聯會並非在《稅務條例》第88條中獲豁免繳稅的慈善機構，故賺錢的話一樣要交利得稅。有會計師估計，若工聯會是法人團體的社團，以利得稅16.5%計算，工聯會避稅金額約392萬元。這個金額對工聯會來說其實只是九牛一毛。(19)
Apple Daily's revelation is comical that the self-proclaimed ''federation of labor unions'' has been turned out to be a property management limited company which is neither a labor union nor federation of trade unions at all. Moreover, it's even not any kind of political party at all. This is the true aspect of Hong Kong politics.
Indeed, Hong Kong still lacks the political party law (which idea has been abandoned since 2004) thus each political party of Hong Kong won't publish their donators. Even though financial statements to Companies Registries show amounts of donations, the true identities of donators are still kept secret.
It's also funny that both warring camps want to dox donators and origins of financial resources of political competitors but they harmoniously oppose introduction of the political party law. Why? It will reveal gimmicks of the ''blue versus yellow'' political theatre as major donators are same tycoons.
Con artists of Hong Kong desperately need “falling-behind-ness” of the city for maximizing personal benefits.
COMMENT
''Democracy'' (dictatorship) of listed companies, designated ''trade unions'' and appointed NGOs run politics of Hong Kong. At the same time, other individuals, companies, trade unions and NGOs are automatically excluded from elections, politics and governing of the city. What pro-democracy or labor-friendly lawmakers can do is structurally limited in either PR stunts or journalistic work under the circumstances.
新選舉制度下，選舉委員會增加地區組織代表，有評論認為是「溝淡」商界影響力。本身是總商會界別代表的立法會議員林健鋒表示，選委會中新增的人大、政協界別，當中不少是成功的工商界人士，「如果有部分透過選委會成為立法會議員，工商界的聲音怎麽會薄弱？」(20)
中央領導人多次表示香港須解決房屋問題，工聯會會長吳秋北早前撰文炮轟「地產霸權」。石禮謙批評工聯會挑動社會矛盾，質疑他們從工人身上取得好處，但不能解決失業問題，「很多是政棍，我希望新的立法會趕走政棍，要一班好的議員服務社會，解決社會矛盾」。（21）
特首選舉戰鼓聲漸響，石禮謙說誰做特首「都無所謂」，「香港未來要做好經濟，為中國服務，向世界吸引多些投資進去香港、中國……政治已經沒空間去玩」。過去一年，中央先後訂立《港區國安法》、修改香港選舉制度，他表示中央為下任特首清除了政治系數，「政治不到香港決定……這不是『港人治港』，是愛國者、愛港者治港，愛國者的理念就是如此」。被問對下屆政府的期望，石禮謙表示政府應勇於改革制度，修訂法例加快建屋造地的過程，政策應以民為本，推動香港發展，「今日的政府毋須害怕改動條例，因為這個立法會將配合政府發展的精神」。（22）
In the newly reformed electoral system, the oligarchs exercise overall jurisdiction over the HKSAR in the name of 'pro-establishment' thus they finally got what they wanted by staging the anti-extradition law amendment bill movement and mobilising paid opposition villains.
有策略地勾起中共被迫推動的本港選舉改革（進一步縮小直選議席，消滅分配給區議會的議席，增加橫跨選舉委員會範疇的功能界別指定公司，指定商會，指定利益集團的議席及其分組點票的影響力，然而勞動議席沒變，意味著這純然是向本港寡頭壟斷資本輸送利益），身為真正幕後黑手的本港寡頭最終成功地利用反修例示威和反對派角色獲取了實際上的全面管治權（霸佔香港立法會主導權）。甚至以美國為首的外部勢力根本沒有意在推翻政權或分裂國土，這些都是空想，但是他們現實主義的真政治目的則是幫助包括美企在內的本港寡頭強化其實際社會管治權，同時寡頭壟斷資本利用反修例示威者有效地打擊了競爭對手的企業群(反修例暴徒都沒有攻擊寡頭集團，他們的攻擊名單上的企業都是地產霸權寡頭的競爭對手，這也指明誰是真正的幕後黑手)。如此，地產霸權寡頭足以抗拒和阻礙中共反壟斷的政治作為和社會影響，是因為在體制內部他們兩面人自己充當「中共的影響力」。換言之，為寡頭扮演‘分裂主義’反派角色的反對派演員們實際上完成了他們在政治遊戲上的政治任務。
此外，所謂政治問題和民生問題的二元論是騙局，是因為民生問題就是政治問題，也是經濟問題，換言之，歸根結底，所有社會問題正是民生問題。市民確有不可被抹滅的正當權利關心和討論社會問題，是因為那終究會影響市民的民生。統治階級毫無權利剝奪市民的言論自由。若社會議題與民生無關，那則不會被稱為任何問題，甚至稱不上任何議題，絕不是個問題。
民生問題是個照妖鏡。政治騙徒往往將政治和民生分開來討論，而與其他政治演員們一起扮演正反派角色，並進行政治批鬥的職業摔角比賽，以此掩蓋和迴避社會問題本身。一旦真正著手社會問題就會遭受滅聲和斷糧，得不到寡頭壟斷資本的捐款。
總之，國安法是制止寡頭繼續搗亂的必要措施；雖然選舉改革延續了這個目的，它可以排除反派角色的議員們在議會內搞事，但是實際上同時進一步強化了寡頭的社會霸權（幾乎等於本港全面管治權）。
地產霸權愛民主？本港商界寡頭們自己已經享受非民選的議席和權力分配，因此他們所謂的普選口號完全是虛假的。真正愛民主的則是被所謂建制（體制）排除在外的企業，團體和市民。READ MORE:
APPENDIX
''Leftist'' media Wen Wei Pao and Dow Jones
In 1979, the first advertisement in 12 years appeared in the Tianjin Daily edition of Wen Wei Pao, which was for toothpaste. Mr Chu took this as a sign that the advertising market was about to spring back and spent two months in China visiting all the major media to sell his company as their overseas ad rep. However, he ran into brick walls everywhere he went. The Shanghai Advertising Agency had placed the toothpaste advertisement only after signing exclusive agreements with all media in China.
He sought help from the Shanghai Wen Wei Pao, and they agreed to give Hong Kong Wen Wei Po and Adsale 10% on ads and squeeze another 15% off for commission to the Shanghai Advertising Agency. He wrote a press release on the deal, announcing that Adsale and Hong Kong Wen Wei Po had the connections to help companies publish their advertisements in China. International media got wind of the news, and soon after Dow Jones' VIPs from the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) held a meeting with Adsale and Wen Wei Pao, and agreed that the Dow Jones would represent Wen Wei Pao and Adsale's Technova magazine worldwide. (23)
NOTES
1.Leung Kai Chi, '《香港第一課》21. 為什麼立法會議員只懂批評不會建設？', June 3, 2019. https://matters.news/@leungkaichihk/香港第一課-21-為什麼立法會議員只懂批評不會建設-zdpuAwMGDFUSbqokykNiAq4uQiHLnvKJmerGJN8hRbrWhzh3C
2.Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau (CMAB), '立法會 CB(2)607/04-05(03)號文件', December 2004. https://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/chinese/panels/ca/papers/ca0113cb2-607-3c.pdf
3.https://www.elegislation.gov.hk, 'Cap. 542 Legislative Council Ordinance', May 21, 2021. https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap542!en?INDEX_CS=N
4.Ibid.
5.https://www.legco.gov.hk, '如何制定法律', March 2021. https://www.legco.gov.hk/education/files/chinese/Factsheet/Factsheet7.pdf
6.Leung Kai Chi, '《香港第一課》21. 為什麼立法會議員只懂批評不會建設？', June 3, 2019. https://matters.news/@leungkaichihk/香港第一課-21-為什麼立法會議員只懂批評不會建設-zdpuAwMGDFUSbqokykNiAq4uQiHLnvKJmerGJN8hRbrWhzh3C
7.https://www.speakout.hk, '【分組點票】人大常委修訂選舉制度後立法會分組點票要求仍在議員議案要過關須獲地區直選和功能界別及選舉委員會兩組通過', April 1, 2021. https://www.speakout.hk/焦點新聞/69838/-分組點票-人大常委修訂選舉制度後立法會分組點票要求仍在-議員議案要過關須獲地區直選和功能界別及選舉委員會兩組通過#selected
8.https://www.elegislation.gov.hk, 'Cap. 332 Trade Unions Ordinance', April 23, 2020. https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap332!en-zh-Hant-HK?INDEX_CS=N&xpid=ID_1438403018316_001
9.https://aflcio.org, 'Collective Bargaining', May 26, 2021. https://aflcio.org/what-unions-do/empower-workers/collective-bargaining
10.https://www.lac.org.hk, 'Three Basic Labour Rights and the New Trade Union Movement in Hong Kong', November 25, 2020. https://www.lac.org.hk/en/node/312
11.Yearbook.gov.hk, 職 工 會, Hong Kong, 2001. https://www.yearbook.gov.hk/2001/chtml/07/07-13f.htm
12.https://www.elegislation.gov.hk, 'Cap. 151 Societies Ordinance', September 20, 2018. https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap151!en-zh-Hant-HK?INDEX_CS=N
13.https://www.forbes.com, '#7 Peter Woo', May 27, 2021. https://www.forbes.com/profile/peter-woo/?list=hong-kong-billionaires&sh=584c405a5cf4
14.https://news.tvb.com, '有人發起到商場聚集 尖沙咀聚集者屢與便衣警員口角 ', December 21, 2019. https://news.tvb.com/local/5dfdf47f335d19b909f664ec/有人發起到商場聚集-尖沙咀聚集者屢與便衣警員口角
15.https://www.forbes.com, '#11 Michael Kadoorie', May 27, 2021. https://www.forbes.com/profile/michael-kadoorie/?list=hong-kong-billionaires&sh=a9120e94a028
16.Leung Kai Chi, '《香港第一課》21. 為什麼立法會議員只懂批評不會建設？', June 3, 2019. https://matters.news/@leungkaichihk/香港第一課-21-為什麼立法會議員只懂批評不會建設-zdpuAwMGDFUSbqokykNiAq4uQiHLnvKJmerGJN8hRbrWhzh3C
17.https://www.elegislation.gov.hk, 'Cap. 542 Legislative Council Ordinance', May 21, 2021. https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap542!en-zh-Hant-HK?xpid=ID_1438403408548_001&INDEX_CS=N
18.https://beta.thestandnews.com, '民建聯年收入近 1.5 億創新高 同年區選仍大敗 李慧琼拒透露捐款來源', May 10, 2021. https://beta.thestandnews.com/politics/民建聯年收入近-1-5-億創新高-同年區選仍大敗-李慧琼拒透露捐款來源
19. 馬嶽明, 余秉峰, '財務報告首曝光坐擁2.5億資產工聯會避稅392萬', Apple Daily, August 24, 2018. https://hk.appledaily.com/local/20180824/YEXMUOYFXVBD3DUT5HCUH3FJZE/
20.林健鋒, '後政改時代 問從政者管治良方 林健鋒：打倒地產商無助解決矛盾', MingPao, June 7, 2021. http://www.mingpaocanada.com/van/htm/News/20210607/HK-gch1_r.htm
21.https://news.mingpao.com, '批工聯挑社會矛盾 望趕走立會政棍', June 14, 2021. https://news.mingpao.com/pns/港聞/article/20210614/s00002/1623607847546/批工聯挑社會矛盾-望趕走立會政棍
22.https://news.mingpao.com, '石禮謙：林鄭想偉大 明日大嶼假大空 評歷任特首房策 稱梁振英「玩政治」損經濟城市', June 14, 2021. https://news.mingpao.com/pns/港聞/article/20210614/s00002/1623607846859/石禮謙-林鄭想偉大-明日大嶼假大空-評歷任特首房策-稱梁振英「玩政治」損經濟城市
23.HKGCC, 'Hitting the China Bullseye', accessed June 11, 2021. https://www.chamber.org.hk/en/membership/profile_detail.aspx?profile_id=2
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