Open-source intelligence (OSINT)
IMPORTANT 【重要】
上一篇探討了所謂香港土地房屋問題的本質（4高：高地價，高樓價，高租費，高物價）是港府一直在政策上圍繞和躲避的空置問題。即目前空置/囤積的30多萬永久性居住單位（309,900個空置/囤積居住單位， 2022年 LINK； LINK），而縮不縮短公屋上樓時間只是個因果關係中的「結果」，也是個地產霸權透過官商勾結精心設計和灌輸的偽命題。其他有關土地房屋的種種問題都是圍繞空置問題的衍生物或次要的或局部的，因此始終不應該失去焦點和整體。這裡有些盲點，譬如，「縮不縮短公屋上樓時間」，目前開始等上公屋的等候時間（至少部分申請者的）是最久要等到預計建成360,000個單位的2032年，即10年等樓時間。這意味著李家超政府任期的未來5年內縮短等樓時間根本是在邏輯上先驗地不可能了，除非在5年內不到6年前建成所有預計的單位。建成所有預計單位的時間是最正確劃定的等樓時間，是因為多多少少部分申請者不可避免地是前面建成的單位數量所無法容納的。此外，當然要解決危樓問題，但重建/所謂「市區融合策略」的重點（致命的一點）是法定機構（官商共謀的平台），‘地產商’市建局究竟如何補償被買斷業權的業主，即受影響業主們至少應該爭取到令人滿意的樓換樓及其過渡期的賠償。這是其底線/防線，因此討論絕不應該被轉移到其他次要的表面議題上面去。
The previous article explored the nature of the so-called land and housing problem in Hong Kong (4 highs: high land price, high property price, high rent, high commodity price) is the vacancy / hoarding of more than 300,000 permanent flats (309,900 vacant / hoarded flats in 2022) that the Hong Kong government has been avoiding in its policy, and the reduction or non-reduction of public housing waiting time is only an effect. It is also a false proposition carefully designed and instilled by the real estate oligarchs through collusion between the government and business. All other issues related to land and housing are derivative or secondary or partial to the vacancy / hoarding problem and should not be lost in focus. There are some blind spots here, for example, "to shorten the waiting time for public housing", the current waiting time for public housing (at least for some applicants) is up to 2032 when 360,000 units are expected to be built, i.e., 10 years. This means that shortening the waiting time in the next five years of the Lee administration's tenure is a priori logically impossible, unless all the projected units are completed in less than six years. The time to complete all the projected flats is the most correctly defined waiting time, because the number of applicants is inevitably beyond the capacity of the number of flats completed before. In addition, of course, the problem of dangerous buildings has to be solved, but the key point (the fatal point) of the redevelopment/so-called "urban integration strategy" is how the statutory body (the platform for government-business collusion), the 'property developer' URA, will compensate the owners who have been bought out of their property, i.e., the affected owners should at least get a satisfactory compensation for the exchange of their flats and the transition period. This is the bottom line/defence line, and the discussion should not be diverted to other superficial issues of secondary importance.
最好笑的是所謂KPI（關鍵績效指標 / Key Performance Indicators），與內地官僚正相反，港府官僚基本上是有責不問的。簡言之，到時KPI不達標又怎樣？還是不會有人因此而下台的，實際上沒怎樣。甚至，在施政報告的敘事鋪路之下2027年6月30日或下一屆新政府任期內才能確定達不達標的，到時李家超政府全體已完成任期，不達標也可以走人。誠然，KPI論在制度層面早已不存在任何約束力，是因為在港府，KPI是與任免脫鉤的。這個差別待遇是因為港府官僚也是統戰對象的當地「社會勢力」，這顯然並不等於中央或內地地方政府的公務員。
一國兩制的特點之一是「不解放」。中共並沒有解放香港和澳門，是因為運用了一國兩制。據一樣的道理，目前沒有人喊「解放台灣」，是因為中共改採一國兩制方針了。關於統戰，《中共中央關於西藏工作方針的指示》（1953年）提供比任何香港媒體更準確的統戰概念。 雖然西藏是被解放的，經濟狀況，解放軍的處境也大不同，但是統戰爭取的目標和基本對待方式是一樣的。
The funny thing is that the so-called KPIs (Key Performance Indicators), contrary to the mainland bureaucrats, are basically not the responsibility of the Hong Kong government bureaucrats. In short, so what if the KPI does not meet the target? No one will step down because of this, in fact, nothing will happen. Even, under the narrative of the policy address to pave the way for June 30, 2027, or the next term of the new government to determine whether to meet the target, by then the John Lee Ka-chiu government has completed its term, not to meet the target can also be absolved. Admittedly, the KPI theory has long ceased to have any binding effect at the institutional level, because in the Hong Kong government, KPI is unlinked from the appointment and removal. This differential treatment is because Hong Kong government bureaucrats are also the local "social forces" that are the target of the united front strategy, which is obviously not the same as civil servants of the central government or local governments in the mainland.
One of the characteristics of "one country, two systems" is non-liberation. The Communist Party did not liberate Hong Kong and Macau because of the use of "one country, two systems''. By the same token, no one is calling for the "liberation of Taiwan" because the CCP has changed to the "one country, two systems" approach. Regarding the united front, the "Directive of the CPC Central Committee on Tibetan Work Policy" (1953) provides a more accurate concept of the united front than any Hong Kong media. Although Tibet was liberated, the economic situation and the situation of the PLA were very different, the goal and basic approach of the united front were the same.
1. 「爭取達賴及其上層集團的大多數，孤立少數壞份子，達到不流血地在多年內逐步地改革西藏經濟政治的目的。」（《毛澤東選集第五卷》，1977年，62頁）據此，港府官僚及包括地產寡頭，商會在內的整個香港統治階級的大多數是統戰對象，主要集中體現在選委會（據2022年10月31日選民登記數字，1446/ 1500名；LINK）。孤立的則是反對派。但是，實踐證實了這個劃分本身是簡單二分法的，不精確，仍不適於香港的朋黨（官商共謀，兩面人）政治的生態環境，是因為，就整體而言，所謂反對派只不過是角色分配的產物（反派角色）而已。它的政治功能是在所謂選舉改革上面終極完成的，即蜥蜴斷尾（代罪羔羊）。金主們犧牲反對派一翼，而完全保留了另一翼，所謂建制派，反而實現的是更經濟的政壇壟斷。2021年3月選舉改革並沒有排除反對派的金主們，是因為一樣的金主們本來控制兩派，所謂改革拿掉的絕不是金主們自己。
2. 「暫時一切仍舊，拖下去，以待一年或兩年後我軍確能生產自給並獲得群眾擁載的時候，再談這些問題。在這一年至兩年內可能發生兩種情況：一種是我們團結多數孤立少數的上層統戰發生了效力，西藏群眾也逐步靠攏我們，因而使壞份子及藏軍不敢舉行暴亂，我軍在自衛鬥爭中舉行反攻，給以打擊。」（同上，62頁） 光是2019年反修例風波證明了針對香港的上層統戰不但沒有起作用，也是徹底失敗的。主因是過度重視上層集團，而欠缺群眾基礎。2021年12月19日立法會地方選區選舉結果顯示了所有香港選民（4,472,863人）中的4分之3仍支持民主派，而只有4分之1則支持建制派（全選民中僅有1,232,555票支持）。 重點是所謂建制派代表的是統戰對象的上層集團，而不是中共本身。換言之，香港當地的上層集團本身是在政治上缺乏群眾基礎的，因此針對他們的統戰根本不可能會自動化地建立群眾基礎的。 這跟西藏統戰有極大的不同。
3. 「他們既不願意實行，那麼好吧，目前就不實行，拖一下再說。時間拖得愈久，我們的理由就愈多，他們的理由就愈少。拖下去，對我們的害處並不大，或者反而有利些。各種殘民害理的壞事讓他們去做，我們則只做生產，貿易，修路，醫藥，統戰（團結多數，耐心教育）等好事，以爭取群眾，等候時機成熟再談全部實行協定的問題。如果他們覺得小學不宜辦，則小學也可以收場不辦。」（同上，63頁）這解釋了一國兩制是統戰的制度化（一切仍舊，拖時間，團結上層多數，耐心教育）。整個一國兩制本身是統戰的概念演化和體現。那麼，為何香港這麼亂？為什麼針對香港的統戰效果不佳？是因為統戰對象的離地上層集團本身嚴重欠缺群眾基礎。
4. 「最近拉薩的示威不應看作只是兩司倫等壞人做的，而應看作是達賴集團的大多數向我們所作的表示。其請願書內容很有策略，並不表示決裂，而只要求我們讓步。其中暗示恢復前清辦法不駐解放軍一條，不是他們的真意。他們明知這是辦不到的，他們是企圖用這一條交換其他各條。在請願書內批評了十四輩達賴，使達賴在政治上不負此次示威的責任。他們以保護西藏民族利益的面目出現，他們知道在軍事力量方面弱於我們，但在社會勢力方面則強於我們。我們應當在事實上（不是在形式上）接受這次請願，把協定全部實行延緩下去。他們選擇在班禪尚未到達的時機舉行這次俄示威，是經過考慮的。」（同上，63頁）此處示威可以換成反修例風波來看。反修例風波應該看作是香港上層集團的大多數向中共所作的表示。要求的明明是讓步，即「因果由國，容港治己，義憤民誠」（LINK）。反修例風波想證明的是香港上層集團在軍警力量方面當然弱於中共，但在社會勢力方面則強於中共。結局，後反修例風波的改革停在選舉制度層面，而並沒有涉及向外分散政府功能的臃腫法定機構；反壟斷以及共同富裕在港寥寥無期；逃犯條例修訂案被永久斷送等種種讓步。
5. 「社會勢力方面他們強於我們這一點一時也不會變化，因而達賴集團不願意全部實行協定這一點一時也不會變化。我們目前在形式上要採取攻勢，責備此次示威和請願的無理（破壞協定），但在實際上要準備讓步，等候條件成熟，準備將來的進攻（即實行協定）。」（同上，64頁）據此，港區國安法算是中共政治攻勢的顯著成就，但實施前港府官僚們的軟性抵抗主要體現在國安公署的在港執法的問題上。甚至，23條尚未立法，沒有其時間表是屬於中共的讓步。從此也可看出，與市民的曖昧觀念不同，在統戰上，連港府及其官僚機構也都是屬於所謂「社會勢力」的範疇。
1. ‘To win over the majority of Dalai and his upper class and to isolate a few bad elements for the purpose of bloodlessly and gradually reforming Tibet's economy and politics over a period of years.’ (Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 5, 1977, p. 62) Accordingly, the majority of the Hong Kong government bureaucrats and the entire ruling class of Hong Kong, including the property oligarchy and the Chamber of Commerce, are the targets of the united front, mainly concentrated in the EC (1446/1500 according to the October 31, 2022 voter registration figures). Those who are isolated are the opposition. However, practice proves that this division is inherently dichotomous, imprecise, and still inappropriate for Hong Kong's crony (government-business conspiracy, two-faced) political ecology, because, as a whole, the so-called opposition is merely a product of role distribution (the role of the villain). Its political function is ultimately accomplished in the so-called electoral reform, i.e., the lizard cuts its tail (scapegoat). The March 2021 election reform did not exclude the opposition's owners because the same owners originally controlled both warring parties, and the so-called reform did not take away the owners themselves.
2. "For the time being, everything should remain the same, and we should delay until a year or two later when our army is really able to produce and support itself and has the support of the masses, then we can talk about these problems. In this year or two, two scenarios may happen: one is that our united front on the upper-layer of the society, which unites the majority and isolates the minority, will be effective, and the Tibetan masses will gradually draw closer to us, thus deterring the bad elements and the Tibetan army from holding riots, and our army will counterattack and strike in self-defence struggles." (ibid., p. 62) The 2019 anti-extradition law amendment bill movement alone proves that the united front against the upper echelons of Hong Kong not only did not work, but was also a complete failure. The results of the December 19, 2021 Legislative Council Geographical Constituency election show that 3 out of 4 of 4,472,863 voters in Hong Kong still support the democratic camp, while only 1 out of 4 support the pro-establishment camp (1,232,555 votes from all voters). The point is that the so-called pro-establishment camp represents the upper echelon of the united front, not the Chinese Communist Party itself. In other words, the local upper class in Hong Kong lacks a political mass base, so the united front against them would not be able to build a mass base automatically. This is very different from the Tibetan united front.
3. "If they don't want to do it, then fine, let's not do it now and delay it for a while. The longer we delay, the more reasons we will have and the less reasons they will have. It will not do us much harm to delay, but it will be more beneficial. Let them do all kinds of bad things that are cruel and harmful to the people, while we only do good things such as production, trade, road construction, medicine, and unification / united front (uniting the majority and patient education) to win over the masses, and wait for the right time to discuss the implementation of all the agreements. If they think it is not appropriate to open elementary school, they can also close them down.'' (ibid., p. 63) This explains that the "one country, two systems" is the institutionalization of the united front (everything remains the same, delay, unite the upper majority, and educate patiently). The whole concept of "one country, two systems" itself is the evolution and embodiment of the united front. So, why is Hong Kong in such a mess? Why is the united front against Hong Kong ruling class ineffective? The reason is that the local upper echelons of the united front group itself is seriously lacking in popular base.
4. "The recent demonstrations in Lhasa should not be seen as the work of the bad guys like the two Si-Luns, but rather as a gesture from the Dalai majority to us. The petition is very tactful and does not indicate a break, but only asks us to give in. The one that implies the restoration of the former Qing dynasty method without the PLA is not their real intention. They know full well that this cannot be done, but they are trying to exchange this article for other articles. In the petition, they criticized the 14th Dalai so that the Dalai could not be held politically responsible for the demonstration. They are presenting themselves as protecting the interests of the Tibetan nation, knowing that they are weaker than us in terms of military power, but stronger than us in terms of social power. We should accept this petition in fact (not in form) and delay the implementation of the agreement in its entirety. They chose to hold this Russian demonstration at a time when Panchen had not yet arrived, and they did so after careful consideration.'' (ibid., p. 63) The demonstration here can be viewed in the context of the anti-extradition law amendment bill movement. The anti-extradition law amendment bill movement should be seen as a gesture by the majority of the upper class in Hong Kong to the CCP. What they are asking for is clearly a concession, that is, "let the state be the cause and effect, let Hong Kong rule itself, and let the people be righteous and angry". What the anti-amendment controversy is trying to prove is that the upper echelons of Hong Kong are certainly weaker than the CCP in terms of military and police power, but stronger than the CCP in terms of social power. In the end, the post-anti-amendment reforms stopped at the aspect of the electoral system, but not at the level of the bloated statutory bodies that decentralize government functions; the anti-monopoly and the common wealth are few and far between in Hong Kong; the amendments to the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance were permanently cut off; and other concessions.
5. "The fact that they are stronger than us in terms of social power will not change at any time, and therefore the Dalai Group's reluctance to implement the agreement in its entirety will not change at any time. We are now formally going on the offensive, rebuking the demonstrations and petitions for being unreasonable (breaking the agreement), but in reality we must be prepared to give in and wait for the conditions to be ripe for a future offensive (i.e., implementing the agreement).'' (ibid., p. 64) Accordingly, the Hong Kong national security law was a notable achievement of the CCP's political offensive, but the soft resistance of the Hong Kong government bureaucrats before its implementation was mainly embodied in the issue of the National Security Office's enforcement in Hong Kong. Even the fact that Article 23 has not yet been legislated and does not have a timetable is a concession by the Chinese Communist Party. It is clear from this that, contrary to the ambiguous notion of the public, even the Hong Kong government and its bureaucracy belong to the so-called "social forces" in terms of the united front.
FAKE:
在2022年11月4日（星期五），中國疾控中心流行病前首席科學家，異見份子曾光在美國花旗集團舉辦的內部研討會上說：內地與香港免檢疫通關可能早於明年上半年。
On Friday, November 4, 2022, dissident Zeng Guang, former chief scientist for epidemiology at the CCDC, told an internal seminar at Citigroup that quarantine-free customs clearance between the mainland and Hong Kong could come as early as the first half of next year.
FACT:
在2022年11月5日（星期六），國家疾控局在新聞發布會上表示，由於疫情形勢更加嚴峻複雜，中國將堅持動態清零總方針不動搖。
On Saturday, Nov. 5, 2022, NHC said at a press conference that China will adhere to the general policy of dynamic ZEROCOVID as the epidemic situation becomes more serious and complex.
國家疾病預防控制局明確否定了中國在疫情惡化中放棄清零政策的可能性。換言之，中國不會改採與病毒共存的。不過，路透社及香港媒體聯合發放的未經證實的消息已十分成功地炒股了。11月4日，以恆指HSI 16, 161.14點來收市，大漲5.36%；有關消息被證實為虛假之後的11月7日，也仍然以恆指16, 595.91點來收市，漲了2.69%。就地產股，從10月31日的18623.56點，等到11月4日大漲到20162.12點，11月7日也仍持續漲到20456.43點了（LINK）。誠然，這跟11月1日至3日舉辦的一系列金融峰會活動（公關 LINK）並沒有直接的關聯。
股市反應的是2580家香港上市公司的內部經濟，而不是社會整體的實際經濟狀況（香港交易所每月市場概況：LINK）。未經證實的消息短暫炒股的受害者將會是投資者本身。這個問題的重點是，在港府官僚默認之下，媒體為炒股發放損害國策的未經證實消息淪為常態，投資者也一面倒地照搬接受有關未經證實的消息。甚至，中央政府證實該消息不屬實之後，仍然照該不實消息炒股。基於虛假消息的集體炒股行為，這金融操縱並不代表什麼經濟繁榮，其本質是未經證實的假消息，空中樓閣，而非任何客觀的物質條件支撐的。
關於與病毒共存，變種病毒毒性逐步弱化導致重症和死亡個案減少了。香港從2022年疫情高峰的3月30日（1,051,725 現有病例/活躍個案 active cases）一度在2022年5月30日降到最低位（10357 active cases LINK）， 不過，之後三度進一步放寬了防疫措施（10月6日，10月20日，11月3日 LINK）。結局，過了今年第二高峰（9月22日紀錄了298,019 active cases）之後，11月7日又開始進入新一波（180,008 active cases）了。10月6日的一日個案增數為3993 （LINK）；10月20日的一日個案增數為5433； 11月3日的一日個案增數為5245。 若是真正的動態清零，記錄到大陸嚴緊防疫措施的5,436例水平，則絕不會放寬防疫措施的。然而，香港政府做的卻是疫情愈惡化，愈放寬，結局越來越遠離與內地全面免檢疫通關的可能性而已。清零是最起碼的國家要求。在疫情高企下，逐步放寬防疫措施乃與病毒共存。至少要誠懇的承認與病毒共存。在2022年9月24日衞生防護中心傳染病處主任張竹君承認了：
香港是一個對外的地方，暫時每日仍有幾千宗個案，認為「去到零」機會較小，除非全世界清了所有個案，目前看來可能與新冠病情並存。 （LINK）
這句話掀開了一系列放寬防疫措施的後續動作。香港目前採取的是與病毒共存。
National Administration of Disease Control and Prevention has explicitly denied the possibility of China abandoning its zero policy in the event of a worsening outbreak. In other words, China will not switch to co-existing with the virus (WITHCOVID). However, the unconfirmed news released jointly by Reuters and Hong Kong media has been very successful in speculating the stock market: on November 4, the market closed at 16,161.14 points on the Hang Seng Index (HSI), up 5.36%; and on November 7, even after the news was confirmed to be false, the market still closed at 16,595.91 points on the HSI, up 2.69%. For real estate stocks, from 18,623.56 points on October 31, it rose to 20,162.12 points on November 4, and continued to rise to 20,456.43 points on November 7. Admittedly, this is not directly related to the series of financial summit events held from November 1 to 3.
The stock market reflects the internal economy of the 2580 Hong Kong listed companies, not the actual economic situation of the community as a whole. The victims of short term speculation on unconfirmed news will be the investors themselves. The point is that, with the tacit approval of Hong Kong government bureaucrats, it has become the norm for the media to release unconfirmed news for stock speculation that undermines national policy, and investors have lopsidedly accepted the unconfirmed news. Even after the Central Government confirmed that the news was untrue, investors continued to speculate on the stock market based on the untrue news. This financial manipulation does not represent any economic prosperity, but is essentially 'unconfirmed' disinformation, a castle in the air, not supported by any objective material conditions.
Regarding coexistence with the virus, the virulence of the variant has gradually weakened leading to a decrease in severe illnesses and deaths. In Hong Kong, from the peak of the epidemic in 2022 on March 30 (1,051,725 existing cases/active cases) to the lowest level on May 30, 2022 (10,357 active cases), but further relaxation of precautionary measures was introduced three times afterwards (October 6, October 20, November 3). In the end, after the second peak of the year (298,019 active cases on September 22), a new wave (180,008 active cases) started on November 7. The one-day increase on October 6 was 3993; the one-day increase on October 20 was 5433; and the one-day increase on November 3 was 5245;. If it were a true dynamic ZEROCOVID, recording 5,436 cases at the level of the Mainland's strict epidemic prevention measures, the epidemic prevention measures would never have been relaxed. However, what the Hong Kong government is doing is that the more the epidemic worsens, the more it is relaxed, ending up further and further away from the possibility of full quarantine free customs clearance with the mainland. Zero is the minimum national requirement. With the epidemic at a high level, the gradual relaxation of quarantine measures is a way to coexist with the virus. At the very least, a sincere acknowledgement of coexistence with the virus is required. On September 24, 2022, Cheung Chuk-kwan, Director of the Infectious Disease Branch of the Centre for Health Protection (CHP), admitted that:
Hong Kong is an external place, for the time being, there are still thousands of cases per day, and it is considered less likely to "go to zero" unless the world clears all cases, which currently seems likely to coexist with the new coronary disease.
This statement sets in motion a series of follow-up actions to relax vaccination measures. Hong Kong is currently taking a coexistence approach with the virus.
NEWS 【事實關係】
SHANGHAI, Nov 4 (Reuters) - China will make substantial changes to its "dynamic-zero" COVID-19 policy in coming months, a former Chinese disease control official told a conference hosted by Citi on Friday, according to a recording of the session heard by Reuters.
Separately, three sources familiar with the matter said China may soon further shorten quarantine requirements for inbound travellers.
Zeng Guang, former chief epidemiologist at the Chinese Centre for Disease Control and Prevention who has remained outspoken on China's COVID fight, said the conditions for China opening up were "accumulating", citing new vaccines and progress the country had made in antiviral drug research. […]
This week's optimism defies news of rising infections and widespread COVID-related disruptions in China, including the postponement on Friday of the Guangzhou auto show that had been planned for later this month.
Chinese health authorities will hold a press conference at 3 p.m. (0700 GMT) on Saturday on COVID-19 prevention, according to a notice that said officials from the National Bureau of Disease Control and Prevention would attend. No other details were immediately available.
內地何時放寬防疫政策，備受全球關注。據外電報道及網上流傳的會議紀錄，中國疾控中心流行病前首席科學家曾光昨日（4日）在美國花旗集團舉辦的內部研討會上說，動態清零政策「很快有實質性變化」、「不會等到明年春天」，今後半年內將有很多新政策出來。他又指內地與香港通關「可能早於明年上半年」，先於向國外開放。相關消息刺激內地及港股急升。路透社引述消息稱，內地或很快將入境隔離時間縮短至七或八天。[…]
稱中央半年內推多項新政
「現在情況在發生變化，我國動態清零也會發生重大變化，很快實質性變化就會發生。」據路透社得到的會議錄音，中國知名傳染病專家曾光昨天在花旗集團一場會議上說，中國開放的條件正在「積累」，因為新的疫苗與中國在抗病毒藥物研究方面取得進展。
報道稱，花旗集團中國首席經濟學家余向榮在會上問到，中國是否會在明年三月全國人大會議後，採取開放政策，曾光回答說，中國未來五到六個月將推出許多新政策。花旗銀行拒絕評論曾光的言論，曾光和余向榮也沒有回覆查詢。[…]
曾光的言論昨天在內地網絡引起熱議，國務院發展研究中心研究員江宇發文質疑是「謠言」，認為「一些商業金融機構製造『疫情防控政策馬上要放開』的謠言，往往夾雜着對某些行業行情的預期和引導」
China Covid Cases Jump to Six-Month High as Outbreaks Flare 【彭博】-- 隨著全國各地爆發疫情，中國單日新增感染病例升至六個多月來最高水平，而衛生官員表示中國將堅持嚴格的防疫措施。
中國報告周日新增感染病例5,436例，比前一天增加27%，創下5月2日以來最高水平——當時上海正處於封控之中。 […]
未經證實的社交媒體帖子上周激發了對中國會開始放鬆疫情零容忍政策的希望，但衛生官員周末的講話打擊了這種希望。國家疾控局官員周六在備受期待的新聞發布會上表示，由於疫情形勢更加嚴峻複雜，中國將堅持動態清零總方針「不動搖」。
「實踐證明，我們關於疫情防控策略和一系列戰略舉措是完全正確的，」國家疾控局傳防司二級巡視員胡翔周六在發布會上稱。「也是最經濟的、效果最好的。」[…]
彭博新聞社此前報導稱，中國官方正在制定取消國際客運航班熔斷機制的計畫。
延伸閱讀：中國據稱考慮取消國際客運航班熔斷機制 正在制定相關計畫
據彭博新聞社上個月引述知情人士的消息報導，政府官員還在探討放寬對入境旅客的隔離限制。
然而，國家衛健委官員周末指出，當前國內疫情形勢要求堅持動態清零總方針不動搖。國家疾控局監督一司二級巡視員妥佳在發布會上表示，一些地方處置疫情存在簡單化、一刀切、「層層加碼」等問題，將督促被群眾投訴較多的鄭州、深圳等地的相關部門進行整改。
COMMENT 【評語】
一言以蔽之，從2022年9月24日以來明顯改採與病毒共存的香港，在港府默認下媒體聯合發放未經證實的消息來一時炒股是個不良現象。不但損害了國策，也令人擔憂的是在國家證實不屬實之後，投資者仍一面倒地盲信未經證實的消息。
In a nutshell, Hong Kong, which has apparently changed its approach to WITHCOVID since September 24, 2022, is a bad place to speculate on stocks shortsightedly. Not only does it undermine national policy, it is also worrying that investors are still blindly believing unsubstantiated news even after the state has proven it to be untrue.
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